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In recent years, forestry carbon offset projects have been on the rise. While 
praised for their ability to offset emissions inexpensively, these programs are also 
criticized for their tendency to overlook other important social, environmental and 
economic processes. This thesis examines the site of a major carbon offset program in the 
western Amazon of Peru as a case study for multi-objective conservation planning. Using 
a recently released high resolution carbon dataset, this study first identifies areas of 
highest above ground carbon density. It then innovates by generating models for two 
additional conservation measures: forest connectivity and deforestation probability.  
While the forest connectivity model is informed by landscape ecology and is a more 
simple modification of least cost path, the deforestation model uses principles of 
economic rent to produce spatially explicit probabilities. 
By incorporating concepts of landscape ecology and economic rent, this work 
presents new models for the study area and adds to the theory surrounding multi-
objective conservation planning. It also identifies if, how, and where three distinct 
 vi 
conservation criteria can find commonalities. Unsurprisingly, the three criteria result in 
distinct spatial patterns. When all three are prioritized, less than 3% of the study area 
qualifies for priority. However, while this analysis highlights the difficulty of 
simultaneously prioritizing all three criteria, it also offers hope. Landscape-level analyses 
can help policymakers and conservation practitioners prioritize these limited areas while 
household-level and broader contextual information can help inform how initiatives are 
ultimately implemented. Given the limited area under all three criteria, stakeholders can 
strengthen efforts by encouraging connectivity-enhancing land use practices, 
incorporating areas where two criteria are met, or further facilitating nearby community 
involvement. As pressures to marry social, environmental and economic continue, 
incentive schemes will need to rethink these strategies and innovate, and further research 
should be conducted.  
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Chapter 1:  Overview 
This project uses the principles of landscape ecology and economic rent to inform 
current approaches for setting carbon conservation priorities. Reducing greenhouse gas 
emissions from deforestation and forest degradation is now a vital component in climate 
change mitigation strategies. Global initiatives such as the United Nations program for 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) are receiving 
increased investments (Ecosystem Marketplace 2014, Ecosystem Marketplace, 2011b)1, 
and carbon offsetting has emerged in the form of both compliance schemes and voluntary 
markets (Bayon et al. 2012, Ecosystem Marketplace 2011a, Kollmuss et al.2008).  
With over 247 carbon projects as of 2012, the country of Peru sits at the forefront 
of this carbon frontier.2 Peruvian carbon projects draw an estimated investment of over 
US$12,800 million, and have experienced  more than a one-thousand percent increase 
from the 18 projects in place in 2004 (FONAM 2012). As of 2013, Peru was the second-
largest offsetter of carbon emissions worldwide (5.1 MtCO2e)3, with 14 
afforestation/reforestation projects (Ecosystem Marketplace 2014).   
                                                 
1 In 2013, REDD comprised two-thirds of forest carbon offset transactions at the project level, with private 
sector buyers injecting millions of dollars towards halting tropical deforestation. Additionally, more than 
80% of offsets were transacted from projects that reduce emissions from deforestation (REDD), with the 
majority sourced from Latin America—an area that tripled in activity since 2012 and to hold almost half of 
overall market shares in 2013. 
2 As of 2015, Peruvian carbon projects mostly fell under the umbrellas of Results-Based Financing (RBF), 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), or more generally the private 
sector voluntary market (World  Bank 2014). Results-Based Financing (RBF) describes funding approaches 
where payment is made upon delivery of verified pre-defined results (World Bank 2014) and is the 
financing approach where development objectives and policy goals feature most prominently. In contrast 
REDD+ projects can be national, jurisdictional or local in scale. Currently, the majority of REDD programs 
occur in the absence of a compliance mechanism, with funding from bilateral or multilateral sources (ex: 
Forest Carbon Partnership Facility). Nearly all REDD transactions are held on the voluntary carbon market 
(World Bank 2014), which in contrast to compliance markets (regulated by mandatory regional, national or 
international rules), allow companies and individuals to purchase carbon offsets as desired (Bayon et al. 
2012, Kollmuss, Zink & Polycarp 2008). 
3 5.1 million MgCO2 
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However, while carbon projects have gained popularity among international 
investors and foreign aid programs, they are not without their critics. Policy interventions 
seeking to simultaneously reduce deforestation and poverty in tropical countries entail 
complex socioenvironmental trade-offs (Andersen et al. 2012). Despite their potential to 
reduce deforestation and increase the income of the poor (Andersen et al. 2012), carbon 
markets may also perpetuate harmful social and economic hierarchies (Lohmann 2009, 
2012; Griffith 2008), misappropriate conservation resources (Andersen et al. 2012, 
Leguia, Malky & Ledezma 2011, Griffith 2008), and prioritize emissions avoidance over 
other forest characteristics that are important for conservation, such as tree-species 
diversity or habitat connectivity (Siikamäki & Newbold 2012, Strassburg et al. 2010, 
Putz and Redford 2009, Kirby & Potvin 2007). 
 To address these concerns, this research uses two key frameworks—(a) principles 
of economic rent and (b) principles of landscape ecology—to inform the prioritization of 
areas for carbon conservation in the northwest buffer zone of Cordillera Azul National 
Park (PNCAZ), San Martin, Peru. This research compares three different allocation 
schemes and the resultant landscape configurations for electing conservation sites. These 
three schemes are built on the following priority criteria, respectively: (1) highest 
aboveground carbon storage, (2) landscape connectivity, and (3) deforestation 
probability. While the aboveground carbon stocks are based on a recent study (Asner et 
al. 2014), the landscape connectivity model employs a modification of least cost path, 
and the deforestation probability model is spatially explicit, employing both physical and 
social-economic variables. By comparing the different spatial patterns of these schemes, 
this research seeks to answer the question, can a priority configuration be designed that 
finds commonalities with all three criteria?  
Specifically, this study seeks to address the following: 
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(1) How does deforestation probability, as based on social and economic 
variables, vary spatially across the study zone? 
(2) What areas in the northwest PNCAZ buffer zone might be most important 
for maintaining landscape connectivity? 
(3) How does above ground carbon vary spatially as a function of (a) 
economic variables such as access to markets, and (b) landscape 
connectivity? 
(4) (How) Can these three criteria be used to improve the cost effectiveness 
and additionality of carbon conservation projects?  
(5) If these three schemes do result in different landscape configurations, what 
are some of the possible larger ramifications?  
Answering these questions will be vital to maximize the cost effectiveness and 
additionality (i.e. the benefits above and beyond business as usual; more on this later) of 
carbon conservation funds in the future. Between 1997 and 2011, global land use changes 
were conservatively estimated to have resulted in a loss of ecosystem services of between 
$4.3 and $20.2 trillion per year (Costanza et al. 2014). Furthermore, habitat 
fragmentation is predicted to amplify the impacts of climate change by limiting available 
pathways for species movement and increasing the distance species need to disperse in 
order to persist (Nuñez et al. 2013, Straudinger et al. 2012, Coristine & Kerr 2011). In the 
case of Cordillera Azul National Park, long-term conservation will depend largely on the 
preservation of this habitat connectivity and conservation corridors.  
Additionally, as evidenced by Cordillera Azul’s 2011-2016 Master Plan, the 
northwest corner of the park’s buffer zone—where this research focuses—has the highest 
number of roads, the most community settlements within less than 2 km of the park, and 
is at the highest risk of land conversion (Gomez et al. 2013, CIMA 2012). Formal and 
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informal land use and development in the area are the result of cultural, economic and 
infrastructural factors. Determining compensation costs for this landscape is a complex 
process, tightly linked to local knowledge of sub-regional product quality, roads or other 
accessibility factors, as well as the location of markets (i.e. main locations for the sale of 
agricultural and non-agricultural goods).  
By conducting research on economic and ecological landscapes, this work will 
provide new information for setting carbon market priorities. Voluntary carbon markets 
are still relatively new and little empirical research has examined the impacts of these 
programs—which could include habitat fragmentation, the displacement of local people, 
and the reinforcement of harmful social and economic hierarchies. Additionally, by 
incorporating new metrics for both deforestation and landscape connectivity, this 
research will contribute to a deeper, more complete understanding of deforestation and 
the market efforts to counteract it worldwide. Even if all three criteria cannot be 
optimized simultaneously, this effort provides insights into how the criteria can be used 
together to create an efficient allocation scheme (i.e. to obtain the biggest forest 
conservation and additionality per dollar) as well as insight into the larger social and 
ecological implications of carbon programs. 
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Chapter 2:  Study Site 
CORDILLERA AZUL NATIONAL PARK 
This research focuses on the buffer zone of Cordillera Azul National Park 
(PNCAZ) in northeastern Peru (see Figure 1) and has been conducted in cooperation with 
the Peruvian Non-Governmental Organization CIMA Cordillera Azul (the Center for 
Conservation, Research, and Management of Natural Areas/Centro de Conservación, 
Investigación, y Manejo de Áreas Naturales).  
Formed in 2002, PNCAZ encompasses 1.3 million hectares, and includes parts of 
four Peruvian departments—San Martin, Loreto, Ucayali, and Huánuco. It is home to 
hundreds of endemic species, including several that have been classified as new to 
science.4 Its 2.5 million hectare buffer zone is meant to offer sustainable economic 
alternatives for more than 250,000 people in 400 communities (Althelia 2015, CIMA 
2012, 2013).5 
                                                 
4 According to the Rapid Biological Inventory, conducted over three weeks in summer 2000, the northern 
Cordillera Azul region may have the highest concentration of habitat types among all Peruvian protected 
areas within the altitudinal range. The RBI team registered species of restricted range and habitat 
distributions for all organism groups sampled. In total, 1600 species of plants were registered (4,000 – 
6,000 estimated for the region) including 12 species that were new to science. Additionally, the team 
registered 71 species of mammal (1 possibly new to science), over 500 species of birds (1 newly described, 
3 new records for Peru), 82 species of amphibians and reptiles (9 potential new species), and at least 22 fish 
species that were new records for Peru, as well as 10 that were possibly new to science. In addition, many 
of these species are listed on CITES-I, and are considered endangered or critically threatened. 
5 According to the Cordillera Azul project overview provided by Althelia, these communities have “almost 
no economy apart from subsistence agriculture” and experience “a poverty rate of over 40%, or about the 
double of Peru poverty rater”. Through the collaboration between CIMA Cordillera Azul, SERNANP and 
Althelia Climate Fund, the carbon financing is meant to provide funds to enhance “governenace of 
communities” as well as prioritize “the restoration of degraded lands in the buffer zone” by providing 
support for “sustainable agroforestry systems that combine food crops to enhance food security (i.e. 
banana, cassava), with sustainable cash crops such as cocoa and coffee to support poverty reduction, in 
partnership with local farmers cooperatives” (among other goals) (See 
https://althelia.com/investment/cordillera-azul-national-park-redd-project/ for details).  
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Upon the park’s formation, CIMA Cordillera Azul signed an agreement with the 
Peruvian government to support the management of the park. In 2008, this contract was 
renewed through 2028 (IGES 2014) and CIMA began working to establish a forest 
carbon offset program in the PNCAZ buffer zone.  
This first program was validated in 2012 under two international carbon 
standards—the Verified Carbon Standard (VCS) and the Climate, Community, and 
Biodiversity Standards (CCBS) (IGES 2014, SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012). As part of the 
verification process, a historical deforestation rate was calculated and a dynamic analysis 
model was used to determine the business as usual scenario, useful for future evaluations 
of the mitigation effect of the park.6  
However, while CIMA’s carbon project was originally designed under the REDD 
framework (later transitioned to REDD+), in 2014 CIMA’s program became part of a 
public-private partnership in collaboration with the Peruvian State (through the National 
Service of Protected Areas-SERNANP) and the Althelia Climate Fund (Althelia 2015). 
Through this public-private partnership, CIMA Cordillera Azul was awarded the highest 
number of carbon bonds to date at the recent twentieth Conference of the Parties for the 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP20) in Lima, December 
2014 (MINAM 2014). The award of €8.55 million euros (approx. US $9.27 million) will 
be distributed over six years and is meant to help support CIMA’s work in the buffer 
zone of Cordillera Azul National Park, including enhanced surveillance, biological 
monitoring, research, institutional strengthening, as well as the development of 
sustainable economic activities (Althelia 2015). These economic activities are said to 
prioritize the recovery and restoration of over 5,000 hectares of degraded lands, which 
                                                 
6 The dynamic analysis used a regression model to derive the relationship between change in deforested 
area and change in population for the historical reference period (in this case, 1989-2003) and included 
information on distance to roads, rivers, towns, forest edge, and any indigenous areas, as well as data on 
elevation, slope, soil, vegetation, and geology as factors (SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012).  
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the project currently estimates will offset 15 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions 
over the next six years. Additionally, the project outlines that CIMA plans to recover all 
of these hectares with the help of local small-scale farmers, who will “harness the 
agroforestry cash crops of coffee and cacao for a more sustainable future” (Althelia 
2015).  
While the buffer zone of PNCAZ lies across four departments, a main focus of 
CIMA’s efforts is the northwestern-most section of the buffer zone, in San Martin. Given 
that San Martin is the most agriculturally productive department and the one experiencing 
the highest deforestation risk (Gomez et al. 2013, CIMA 2012), this thesis focuses on the 
same area (red box in Figure 1, Area of Interest in Figure 4). As of CIMA’s 2008 census, 
the majority of settlers and newly arrived migrants were living within this zone, in the 
region known as the Huallaga Valley (Figure 1). At the time, the total number of 
communities in the Huallaga Valley section of the buffer zone was estimated at 181, with 
approximately 123,200 residents (an estimated 72% of the total residents for the buffer 
zone area) (CIMA 2012). Additionally, park guard workshops and geospatial analysis for 
the 2011-2016 Master Plan for Cordillera Azul National Park7 clearly indicate that this 
section of the buffer zone has the highest number of roads, the highest number of 
communities located less than 2 km from the park, and is at the highest risk for land 
conversion (CIMA 2012). Many of these pressures are assumed to be due to 
agriculturally driven in-migration from the Andes, coast, and other regions (IGES 2014, 
SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012, see Appendix for further information on the history of San 
Martin). 
                                                 
7 Available for download at http://www.cima.org.pe/es/publicaciones, as of July 3rd 2016.  
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Figure 1: The Huallaga River valley.8   
                                                 
8 A tributary of the Marañon, the Huallaga River stretches over 1,000 km (approx. 671 miles). While 
formal labels are limited, three informal designations have been widely adopted for the river’s navigable 
section: upper Huallaga describes the source of the river in the Andes to the town of Tocache in San 
Martin, central Huallaga refers to the segment from Tocache up to Chazuta, and lower Huallaga describes 
the final segment from Chazuta to Yurimaguas (Ziesler & Ardizzone 1979). 
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Chapter 3:  Conceptual Models & Analytical Framework 
To determine whether carbon programs are innovating rather than just reinforcing 
the status quo, it is important to examine how conservation schemes based on 
aboveground carbon differ in spatial nature, extent, and cost effectiveness from schemes 
based on other factors—such as landscape connectivity or deforestation probability. 
Towards this end, this research uses a case study of the northwest corner of the Cordillera 
Azul National Park buffer zone in the Peruvian department of San Martin (the central 
Huallaga Valley) to compare the landscape configurations that result from three distinct 
schemes of assigning conservation priority. These three schemes are based on a) a high-
resolution aboveground carbon density dataset provided by Greg Asner and colleagues 
(2014), b) a model of forest connectivity, and c) a model of deforestation probability. 
Below, the analytical background for these schemes is presented to establish the 
main concepts and motivations behind the three models selected for comparison.   
FOREST CARBON OFFSET PROJECTS 
For decades, market-based mechanisms have been used as tools for environmental 
regulation and protection due to their efficiency (i.e. their ability to achieve the desired 
regulation cheaply).9 This is due in part to the way that market mechanisms help 
internalize externalities, i.e. the costs or benefits that affect parties who did not choose to 
incur the cost or benefit.10 By requiring the responsible party to repair the damage they 
                                                 
9 While market mechanisms were first proposed as a tool for U.S. environmental regulation in the 1960s, 
the initiatives did not come to light until the US Acid Rain Program came into effect in 1990 (Lohmann 
2009).  This was followed by the establishment of a significant carbon trading instrument, the Kyoto 
Protocol, in 1997, and the joining of Europe to the carbon initiative by the early 2000s (Lohmann 2009). 
Since the early 2000s, investments in market mechanisms for conservation have been on the rise, with 
particular gains for carbon. 
10 For example: the air pollution costs one country experiences from an actively polluting neighbor. 
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have caused or to avoid it in the first place, market mechanisms effectively place the 
costs, benefits, and accountability back on to the original party.  
In terms of carbon emissions and offsets, these mechanisms emerge in two forms: 
voluntary market trading or mandatory compliance (e.g. government regulated cap and 
trade programs) (Ecosystem Marketplace 2014, 2011a). However, while in the past 
carbon offsets may have been spread across the two, in recent years, the voluntary market 
has increasingly become the primary forum for forest carbon trading. As of 2010, it 
occupied approximately 42% of the total forest carbon trading market (Ecosystem 
Marketplace 2011a). Between 2012 and 2013 alone, the volume of offsets issued from 
projects that avoid deforestation, provide afforestation or reforestation, improve forest 
management, and incentivize sustainable agricultural practices tripled (Ecosystem 
Marketplace 2014). 
 For forest carbon offset programs initiated on the voluntary market, estimates are 
needed on the aboveground carbon density (ACD) that is present. For the purposes of this 
study, ACD information is sourced from a new high resolution carbon dataset (1 hectare 
resolution) made publicly available by Greg Asner and colleagues, and produced in 
cooperation with the Peruvian Ministry of Environment (Dirección General de 
Ordenamiento Territorial—Ministerio del Ambiente) and Wake Forest University (Asner 
et al. 2014). In the dataset, carbon is measured in megagrams of carbon per hectare (MgC 
ha−1).  
In addition to ACD, forest carbon offset projects (such as the on-going program in 
the buffer zone of Cordillera Azul National Park) require that certain criteria and 
verification standards be met. While levels and types of verification and validation may 
differ, additionality, leakage and permanence are the three most consistently required 




Additionality The reductions in carbon that would not have occurred if business-as-
usual (i.e. the emissions trends before the project was put in place) 
were allowed to continue. 
Leakage An unanticipated increase in emissions outside a project’s boundary 
(ex: this can happen when land users divert activities to nearby areas, 
ultimately causing the same amount of deforestation, degradation, 
and/or emissions in a different spatial distribution).  
Permanence The length of time that carbon will remain stored after being 
sequestered, or the guarantee that the investment will remain intact for 
a sufficient period into the future so as to ensure that the carbon offsets 
purchased by the buyer (i.e. the avoided emisssions) are achieved. 
Sources: World Bank 2014, Van Oosterzee et al. 2012, Kollmuss et al. 2008. 
 
Table 1: Definitions of additionality, leakage, and permanence.  
For the purposes of this study, the basic carbon model uses the new high-
resolution dataset provided by Asner et al. (2014) to isolate those land parcels that 
represent the 80th percentile and above in terms of ACD. The model is later coupled with 
models for deforestation probability and forest connectivity for further analysis and 
discussion.  
FOREST CONNECTIVITY 
While forest carbon programs are generally expected to decrease rates of 
deforestation and forest degradation, measures of forest connectivity, biodiversity and 
future climate change vulnerability remain largely absent from these schemes. Defined as 
the degree to which a landscape facilitates or impedes movement among habitat and 
resource patches, landscape connectivity is an essential part of maintaining healthy 
ecosystems (Taylor et al. 1993, Merriam 1991, Baudry & Schreiber 1988, Merriam 
1984). In its absence, forests may experience increased edge effects (i.e. more 
pronounced boundaries between habitats), changes in community structure, and inhibited 
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movement.11 On a local scale, this may affect wildlife’s capacity to forage, predate or 
avoid predation, and to interact behaviorally. On a larger scale, it also determines their 
ability to migrate, maintain strong genetic diversity, and avoid a high incidence of 
infectious diseases and transmission (Satterfield et al. 2015, Nathan et al. 2008).  
Landscape connectivity can be broadly organized into two categories—that of 
functional connectivity, i.e. processual connectivity between systems, and that of 
structural connectivity, i.e. the physical connectivity between habitats and populations 
(Doerr et al. 2014, Crooks 2006, Hilty & Merenlander 2006, Uezu et al. 2005, With et al. 
1999). While functional connectivity deals with the actual degree to which dispersal and 
movement occur, and is of top importance for protecting ecosystems, gathering this data 
and determining system processes and functions can be quite difficult. Thus, in data 
sparse environments like the study site, structural connectivity is often used as a rough 
proxy for function (Calabrese & Fagan 2004). Defined as those physical links separating 
or uniting populations, landscapes and occupied habitats, structural connectivity takes a 
multitude of forms worldwide.12   
This study specifies connectivity to links between forest patches of a certain size 
and uses a cost distance function alongside the concept of structural connectivity to 
calculate potential conservation corridor areas. While historic models of species 
movement under climate change have focused on the availability of species-specific 
habitat or on standard measures of connectivity (Spencer et al. 2010; Hunter et al. 1988; 
Noss 1987), recent models have begun incorporating assumptions on species movement 
as restricted by  anthropogenic barriers (Nunez et al. 2013). Cost-distance modeling—a 
                                                 
11 For more on this, see Insular Biogeography (also known as Island Biogeography), a field founded by 
ecologists Robert H. MacArthur and E.O. Wilson in the 1960s (MacArthur & Wilson 2015 is the newest 
adaptation of the 1967 original book).  
 
12 Examples of structural connectivity include drainages, overgrown fence lines, intact forest patches, and 
habitat corridors.  
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computationally efficient approach used to identify the relative importance of areas 
between patches for ecological movements (Adriaensen et al. 2003)—has often been used 
for this work, generally with success. Under such models, weights or friction values are 
assigned to each pixel and used to specify the given cost for crossing it (Beier et al. 2008; 
Adriaensen et al. 2003). The general formula for cost distance can be described as: Cost = 
(Cost of travel over a surface) * (Characteristics of the mover) * (Movement 
characteristics on the surface).  
DEFORESTATION PROBABILITY 
While in the past, CIMA Cordillera Azul established the business-as-usual 
calculation for deforestation within PNCAZ and its buffer zone through a linear 
regression between population growth (including in-migration) and annual hectares 
deforested (CIMA 2012), conditions have changed. Since the original calculation, CIMA 
program officials report that the rate of population growth has stayed relatively consistent 
while the rate of deforestation has begun to decline—likely due to either scarcity of land 
or increased productivity per hectare (field interviews, 2015).  
This study examines deforestation at the landscape level and assumes that 
deforestation probability is driven by biophysical (e.g. elevation, slope, and soil type) as 
well as social (population) and economic variables (e.g. access to roads and markets and 
institutional factors). Under this model, landusers are assumed to be rational profit and/or 
utility maximizers, who are more likely to deforest a given area when rents from 
agricultural land uses (Ra) are greater than those obtained from standing forests (Rf) 
(Arima 2016, Nelson et al. 2001, Chomitz & Gray 1996). In turn, these profits, known as 
agricultural rents, are a function of transportation cost (for a further explanation of rent, 
bid-rent and their relationship to deforestation probability, see Appendix).  
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 Given that rent is equal to the prices received for agricultural or forest products 
net of transportation costs minus production costs, this model employs freight cost as a 
proxy for economic rent. More specifically, rents for a given plot of land, i, depend on the 
prices of agricultural and forest products, minus the transportation costs involved with 
getting those products to market. As such, rents can be stated as a function of the distance 
and difficulty of transportation (Arima 2016, Nelson & Hellerstein 1997, Chomitz & 
Gray 1996). The likelihood of a given plot of land i being deforested is then modeled as a 
linear function of transportation costs alongside other control variables for biophysical 
and socioeconomic characteristics.  
Unlike other forms of regression analysis, a logit regression is used to predict 
binary independent variables (in this case, that y is either equal to 1, deforested, or 0 
otherwise). The probability of observing deforestation in cell i can thus be stated as: 
 
Where x is the vector of explanatory variables and β is the vector of coefficients 
associated with the vector of controls. In similar fashion to the theory provided by von 
Thünen (1966)13 and the adaptation provided by Chomitz & Gray (1996) (see Appendix), 
the explanatory variables include transportation costs (cost distance) to approximate 
rent,14 the rate of change for nearby human populations (relative effect of population), 
and slope. The vector of controls includes elevation, precipitation, soil type and protected 
area status (Table 8).  
Assuming that agents act to maximize profit, the probability of observing 
deforestation (y = 1) can be written as a formal logistic model as follows: 
                                                 
13 This represents the English translation of Der isolierte Staat (The Isolated State), originally published 
1826.  
14 i.e. the analytical framework assumes that there is a value for rent attached to each use of each plot of 
land within the study area, and that this rent will ultimately impact what activity the land’s use is devoted to 
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 P(y* > 0│ = P( e > │ = f( ) 
 
yi =  
where f is the logit. 
In this study, economic rent is assumed to correlate positively with the probability 
of deforestation. This is due to the fact that scarce factors of production—whether it be 
land location or quality—will ultimately determine the profitability and thus desirability 
of the land. Similarly, bid-rent ensures that this land, if profitable, will be brought into 
production for its most profitable use (see Appendix). While there are some cases where 
deforestation is expected to yield lower rent than an alternative activity,15 these cases are 
generally rare and often the result of the land being poorly suited for agriculture, or an 
alternative development initiative being put in place. Figure 2, below, shows the 
relationship between deforestation and rent assumed by this study.  
 
                                                 
15 For instance, if the economic rent derived from forestry is greater than that derived from agriculture, the 
forest may actually be harvested more sparingly and managed for long-term growth, rather than being cut.    
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Figure 2: General relationship between economic rent and deforestation. 
However, despite the assumed positive relationship between economic rent and 
deforestation probability, not all sites are equally cost effective for conservation. Instead, 
one must also examine the opportunity cost of intact forest (Plumb et al. 2012, Fisher et 
al. 2011, Naidoo and Adamowicz 2006). Figure 3 divides the relationship between 
economic rent and deforestation into three sub-categories. The lands on the right are 
those with high profitability and at the highest risk for deforestation. These lands are 
likely to experience high opportunity costs and thus require a higher financial offer to 
bring the land out of production. In contrast, the lands on the left represent those with low 
profitability and are at a lower risk for deforestation. While these may be less costly to 
bring out of production, a conservation NGO or institutional body would be hard pressed 





Figure 3: The three major divisions of economic rent. 
Given these divisions, the deforestation model employed by this study focuses on 
the central category—where rent and deforestation probability are neither the lowest nor 
highest. In contrast to the lands on the left and right, these central areas do experience 
moderate levels of deforestation—and are thus good candidates for additionality—while 
also being employed for activities of moderate rent. This means there is a good chance 
that conservationists could afford to compensate landowners at or above their current rent 




Chapter 4:  Methods 
As described earlier, this thesis seeks to compare three schemes for assigning 
conservation priority as based on (1) highest aboveground carbon stocks, (2) 
deforestation probability, and (3) landscape connectivity. Given that the first scheme 
(carbon) relies on a pre-existing dataset produced by Asner et al. (2014), methods for this 
model have been separated out. First, a brief overview of Asner et al.’s (2014) methods 
are presented. This is then followed by a section describing the model variables and data 
sources used for landscape connectivity and deforestation probability, as well as a final 
explanation of how these variables were employed.  
CARNEGIE AIRBORNE OBSERVATORY’S HIGH-RESOLUTION CARBON MAP 
The new carbon dataset provided by Asner et al. (2014) uses available satellite 
and geographic information systems, airborne Light Detection and Ranging (LiDAR), 
and field plot calibration data to develop maps of aboveground carbon density (ACD) as 
well as spatially explicit estimates of uncertainty. For the purposes of this study, this data 
was largely used in its original form (minor modifications may have occurred during 
calculations).  
To produce the model, Asner and colleagues (2014) combined maps detailing the 
country’s geology, soil, floristic communities, elevation and forest cover. These maps 
were used to forecast the potential environments and conditions that could be 
encountered during the airborne surveys that were to follow. The authors then divided the 
country of Peru into 200 x 200 km sampling pixels, and used airborne LiDAR to sample 
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extensively.16 To ensure that more than sufficient sampling had occurred, the 
methodology covered large areas of each potential set of environmental conditions 
(determined previously). Following airborne LiDAR surveys, the authors also combined 
a “diverse array” of satellite data in order to provide “continuous geographic information 
on vegetation cover, topographic variables and climate” (Asner et al. 2014). Both the 
satellite data and LiDAR were processed through geostatistical modelling. They were 
then combined with calibrations of LiDAR to field-estimated carbon stocks. The ultimate 
result was spatially explicit maps of both aboveground carbon stock estimates and 
uncertainty.  
For the dataset, carbon is measured in megagrams of carbon per hectare (Mg C 
ha−1). Nation-wide carbon density measurements range from <0.01 to 156.89 Mg C ha−1 
with an average of 0.31 Mg C ha−1 (uncertainty ranges from <0.01 to 34.66 Mg C ha−1). 
Within the study site, density is slightly higher, with an average density of 67 Mg C ha-1 
(ranging from 0.11 to 150.09 Mg C ha−1).  
LANDSCAPE CONNECTIVITY & DEFORESTATION PROBABILITY TECHNICAL 
MODELS 
Data Sources 
In addition to Asner and colleagues’ (2014) carbon data, this study employs two 
other models, generated a combination of field work, publicly available data, and 
geospatial processing. Field work for this project was conducted in San Martin, Peru 
from June 17th to August 4th, 2015 and focused on three main components: (1) interviews 
with local farmers, (2) interviews with agricultural and conservation professionals in the 
                                                 
16 In the case of this study, “airborne LiDAR” refers to a twin turbopropeller Dornier 228 aircraft, carrying 
the Carnegie Observatory-2 Airborne Taxonomic Mapping System (AToMS; Asner et al. 2012). The 
AToMS LiDAR is described as “a dual laser, scanning waveform capable of firing at 500,000 laser shots 
per second”. 
 20 
area, and (3) GPS ground verification of remotely sensed and other digital format data17 
(see Table 2). 
 
Component Specific Goals Accomplished 
1) Interviews with 
local farmers and 
land users within 
the buffer zone 
A) Collect records of freight cost from 
farmgate to market and identify main 
transportation routes and destinations 
B) Identify perceived drivers of 
deforestation, as well as underlying 
conditions that may affect land use 
C) Collect a contextual history on land use 
and migration in the area 
 Interviews and focus 
groups in 6 communities, 
with 36 individuals 
 








A) Confirm or add new perspective to 
information gained through farmer 
interviews 
B) Construct an agricultural history of the 
area 
C) Identify key programs and actors 
currently or previously active in the 
agricultural or conservation sector in the 
area 
 Interviews with 9 CIMA 
field technicians 
 Interview with Jose 
Santiesteban, Dirreccion 





A) Verify locations of roads, water bodies 
and communities 
B) Verify road condition 
 Personally travelled over 
90% of the study region 
 100 GPS verification 
points collected 
Table 2: Three main components of field work and associated goals. 
The semi-structured interviews used in component 1 and 2 of this study were 
designed to glean information on freight costs. Interviewees were identified via snowball 
sampling, with study subjects helping recruit future subjects among their acquaintances 
and/or within the same community or institution. In the case of farmers (component 1), 
these interviews consisted of 26 questions designed to gather information on farmer 
                                                 
17 Ground verification involves the collection of a set of measurements (usually at the real, physical 
location) that are known to be more accurate than the set of measurements used in the system you are 
testing. By collecting this second set of measurements, large-scale (large??) data can be verified and 
calibrated to better approximate real locations or conditions. 
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migration patterns, preferred crops, profit and cost associated with cultivation, as well as 
temporal and spatial variability in access to markets (see Appendix). Interviewees were 
also asked about the routes they use to transport their products throughout the year and 
the freight costs associated with transport. While many of these responses were 
ultimately used contextually, spatial and temporal information on freight cost was used 
for the deforestation probability model in this study (see Tables 6 and 7). Of the 36 semi-
structured interviews conducted with farmers, all identified proximity to market 
(specified as distance to roads or a main town) as one of the top two factors affecting land 
value (i.e. price). The second most consistently identified factor was water (present in 
approximately 75% of interviews), followed by slope (about 25%).  
Interviews for component 2 were similar to farmer interviews, but can best be 
understood when broken into three types: interviews with CIMA field technicians and 
staff, interviews with other regional or government agricultural authorities, and 
interviews with truck drivers. For the first category, interviews were conducted with all 9 
field technicians working within the area of interest (AOI).18 For this study, each field 
technician was asked the same generalized set of 26 questions as farmers, modified for 
their work region. How long they had worked in the area and where they worked 
previously were also recorded. Finally, each field technician was asked to sketch maps of 
the region where they work, identifying the main crops, communities, pathways of 
transport, and costs of transport throughout.  
Both farmers and field technicians were asked to identify the location of main 
market centers and intermediaries where their products are sold. In total, interviews of 
farmers and CIMA field staff resulted in 115 records for total freight cost between two 
                                                 
18 CIMA field technicians work with approximately 3 to 5 communities in the buffer zone of Cordillera 
Azul National Park, with aims of establishing community norms for co-living, establishing goals for the 
community’s social, economic and environmental future, and providing technical or administrative support 
in achieving these goals. 
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points (81 were unique, more on this later). Records for freight cost to a given market 
were converted to soles per km per sack of product (one sack = 60-65 kilos) by dividing 
the total reported freight by the distance from the community to market in a GIS. 
Interviews also yielded information on local product prices, knowledge of sub-regional 
product quality, and transport preferences.  
In addition to these main groups, 6 other interviews were conducted; 3 with 
agricultural professionals in the area and 3 with truck drivers along the main product-
transport routes. Interviews with agricultural professionals were much more open ended 
and sought to identify the history of land use in the area, the agricultural support services 
currently being offered, and new initiatives that were underway as a part of the popular 
‘alternative development’ movement in the area. In contrast, interviews with truck drivers 
focused on identifying main routes, common stops, main products transported, and the 
prices charged across the zone. While only three interviews were conducted, information 
from truck drivers largely confirmed the freight cost data provided by farmers. 
Additionally, all three drivers covered different spatial domains within the study area. 
In terms of digital data, all files were either originally in or converted to raster 
format, projected to the UTM coordinate system and then resampled to 100 m resolution 
using nearest neighbor algorithms. This cell resolution was selected as it represented a 
good compromise among the different resolutions for available data. The area of interest 
(AOI) was then defined by masking out areas of open water,19 and areas within Cordillera 
Azul National Park boundaries. Given that this area is under specific protection, 
including park data could skew results if institutional factors are not accounted for. The 




remaining 100 m cells are the units of observation (n = 481,622) and include 
approximately 4,817 ha of terrestrial area (Figure 4).20 
 
 
Figure 4: The area of interest (AOI).  
Both the landscape (forest) connectivity and deforestation probability models 
employ several social, economic, and biophysical variables. Below, each of these 
variables is briefly outlined. At the end of the section, Figure 5 displays the spatial nature 
of these variables through a series of maps. A basic schematic then follows indicating 
how each variable was utilized (Figure 6).  
                                                 
20 The AOI excludes water bodies, 4,275 ha of national park land, and 6,424 ha of land outside both the 




Forest cover is a binary variable (1 = deforested, 0 = forested) that forms the 
dependent variable in the deforestation probability model. Deforestation was identified 
using the Global Forest Change 2000-2013 data published by Hansen et al. (2013). This 
dataset was originally available at a resolution of 30 meters, and provides information on 
tree canopy cover in the year 2000 as well as forest loss (2000-2014), forest gain (2000-
2012), year of forest loss (annual basis, 2001-2014) and a data mask showing areas of no 
data, mapped land surface and permanent water bodies. To create the binary forest/no-
forest raster, tree canopy cover in 2000 was used as a base, then adjusted using GIS 
operations to account for both gains and losses from 2000-2013.  
Over the past two decades, deforestation in the study area has largely correlated 
with road development. Shamboyacu was one of the first major market centers 
established, and in the early years deforestation followed the road down from Picota 
towards this epicenter, before branching off to form a dendritic pattern of deforestation 
and dirt (trocha) roadways towards the communities of Santa Rosa, Lejia, Nuevo 
Amazonas, Vista Alegre, and onto Alto Ponasa. Recent years have shown a similar 
pattern appearing farther south. As more and more migrants from neighboring regions 
move in to the area, roads have been created from Bellavista, which lies outside the 
buffer zone, into the interior. Following this trajectory, the towns of Nuevo Lima, Nuevo 
Tarapoto, Yanayacu and finally San Juan have developed. While still largely a frontier 
town, San Juan has also given way to additional expansion even closer to the park’s 
boundary.  Interviews conducted in the summer of 2015 revealed that in the case of these 
communities, most inhabitants have come from Cajamarca, a town in the Sierra region. 
Many of them also confirmed that they had been sold lands in the area (likely illegally), 
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which they had then relocated to claim (more on this in Chapter 6: Discussion). Because 
of this expansion approximately 22.5% of the AOI was deforested (1,106.74 ha) in 2013 
(Table 4, Figure 5). While 77.5% remained forested (3,734.69 ha), these areas face 
increased pressure as expansion continues. 
Roads and Waterways 
As discussed in previous sections, transportation costs are known to affect both 
the price of inputs and the prices of agricultural products, which in turn impact land rent. 
To account for these costs, line, point, and polygon vector GIS files indicating the 
locations of roads, water bodies, communities, and park and buffer zone extent were 
provided by CIMA Cordillera Azul. In the case of roads, the data provided by CIMA 
indicated the type of road, with categories of Asfaltado (Asphalt), Afirmado 
(Reinforced), Sin Afirmar (Un-Reinforced), and Trocha (Dirt pathway or trail). In the 
case of waterways, each river or stream was classified not only by a categorical marker 
(river, stream, etc.) but also by a class value. To verify the accuracy of these datasets, 100 
GPS points were taken along transport routes during the field work conducted for this 
research. Road condition was noted, as were the communities, market centers, and main 
crops along the way. Once verified, CIMA’s GIS files were converted to individual 
rasters using simple GIS operations for value isolation and feature-to-raster conversion. 
For the deforestation probability models, three variables were generated using this 
data. The first is cost distance (explained in further detail in the section to come). In the 
AOI, cost distance has a minimum value of 0, a maximum value of 14.48 and a mean 
value of 3.19. In addition, two variables for Euclidean distance from road and waterways, 
respectively, were also created. While these variables were never used in concert with 
cost distance, they were used as a proxy in the second deforestation probability 
regression. For the AOI, Euclidean distance to roads (EDroads) has a mean value of 
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2,355.55 while Euclidean distance to water (EDwater) has a mean equal to 636.39 (Table 
4).  
Relative Effect of Population (REP) 
CIMA’s work in the buffer zone of Cordillera Azul National Park included 
surveys of the communities they work with in the area. These surveys (called MUF, the 
Mapping of Uses and Benefits, i.e. “Mapeo de Usos y Fortalezas”) have taken place 
approximately every 2-3 years since 2003 (2003, 2005, 2008, 2012) and include 
information on the number of people, dwellings and families in each community visited, 
as well as general sentiments about the park, community relationships, goals, and origins 
(MUF 2003, 2005, 2008).  
Given that both the size of adjacent populations and the distance from a given 
population are thought to relate to deforestation probability (Geist & Lambin 2002, 
Turner et al. 2001, Wibowo & Byron 1999, Mather et al. 1998, Vanclay 1993, Myers 
1991, Allen & Barnes 1985), a scale variable was calculated to indicate these two factors 
simultaneously. Labeled the “Relative Effect of Population” (REP), this variable is 
similar to Gravity Models21 in that it gives each pixel i a value equal to the change in 
population of the closest community divided by the Euclidean distance from that 
community, as follows: 
REPi =  
Where i is a given plot of land, m is the closest reported community to plot i, 
Pop2008 and Pop2005 are the population in community m in years 2008 and 2005 
respectively, and EDim is the Euclidean distance from plot i to the nearest community m 
in km as reported in a GIS.  
                                                 
21 See Anderson 2010 for more on this topic. 
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 While data from 2003 was available for some communities, many of the 
communities in the study area were either not yet established or else not included in the 
survey that year. In 2005, population data was available for 141 communities, with a 
maximum population of 1500 and a minimum population of 0 (mean = 119.58; std. dev. 
= 222.68). Three years later, the number of communities reported remained the same. 
Though the maximum population had decreased to 1200, both the mean population 
(mean = 293) and standard deviation (std. dev. = 282.50) had increased. Euclidean 
distance was then calculated from each pixel to the nearest community in a GIS. 
Euclidean distance for each pixel within the study area ranged from a minimum of 0 
meters (at the population) to a maximum of 51,127 meters (mean = 29,154 meters).22 
Ultimately this resulted in REP values ranging from -11.21 to 10.19, with positive values 
indicating areas where the population has increased during the time period (Table 4, 
Figure 5).  
Soil Type 
Data on soil type was retrieved from International Soil Reference and Information 
Center (ISRIC) using the SoilGrids 1km collection. This dataset provides a categorical 
classification for each pixel, from among 32 different soil groups. In the case of our study 
area, 12 distinct groups are present and occupy anywhere from less than 1% of the study 





                                                 
22 I.e. a given pixel 100 km from a community with population increase of 500 individuals, and a pixel 200 
km from a community with population increase of 1,000 individuals have the same value. 
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Table 3: Soil types found in the study area.  
While this data is the product of an automated global soil mapping system, and 
may contain some spatial or thematic inaccuracies, artefacts and/or missing pixels, it was 
selected for two main reasons. First, soil is an important component in both road 
establishment and agriculture. As such, it is key to account for variations in soil when 
examining deforestation probability. Second, there is limited soil data available for the 
study area and this dataset provides one of the higher resolution options, with no missing 
pixels for the given study site.  
Elevation and Slope 
The Digital Elevation Model (DEM) used in this study was obtained from the 
Peruvian Ministry of the Environment’s Geo Server (geoservidor.minam.gov.pe) and is a 
product of collaboration between the Japanese Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry 
(METI) and NASA. Data resolution is 30 meters; the result of 1.3 million images from 
the ASTER high resolution imaging instrument on the Terra Satellite. To create the 
Elevation variable, four DEM tiles were selected and mosaicked together using GIS 
operations (S07W077, S07W076, S08W077 and S08W076).  
 29 
Elevation in the AOI ranges from 120 m.s.l to 2,992 m.s.l., with an average 
elevation of 554.06 meters (Table 4).  Slope was calculated by performing pre-existing 
ArcGIS® operations on the mosaicked DEM tiles and is presented in degrees. For the 
AOI, slope ranges from 0 to 82.98 degrees with a mean slope of 9.37 (Table 4). 
Precipitation (TRMM) 
Precipitation was calculated using Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) 
product 3B43 Version 7. TRMM reports monthly precipitation in mm/hr and combines 
the estimates generated by the TRMM satellite sensors, other satellite products, and 
CAMS global gridded rain gauge data. While this mission ended on April 15, 2015, it 
provided 17 years of scientific data and ultimately became the space standard for 
measuring precipitation. For this study, TRMM data for 2000-2013 were converted to 
mm/year and then averaged to get the mean mm/year for each pixel during the time 
period. For the AOI, average TRMM for this period ranges from approximately 1,397 to 
2,186 mm/year (mean = 1,668 mm/year) (Table 4). 
 
Variable Min Max Mean Std. Dev. Type of Data 
Forest Cover 0.00 1.00 0.78 0.39 Binary 
EDroads 0.00 31,549.60 2,355.55 0.46 Continuous 
EDwater 100.00 4,204.76 636.39 2.34 Continuous 




-11.21 10.19 1.90E-3 4.07E-4 Continuous 
Slope 0.00 82.98 9.37 0.18 Continuous 
Elevation 120.00 2,992.00 554.06 0.23 Continuous 
Soil Type N/A (See Table 3) Binary 
TRMM 1,397.75 2,186.79 1,668.92 230.79 Continuous 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics for variables in the AOI.  
 30 
 
Figure 5: Maps of the key variables within the AOI.   
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Figure 6: Data components and modelling process.  
Landscape Connectivity  
Determining Forest Patches 
For the forest connectivity model, intact forest patches were identified using the 
Hansen et al. 2013 dataset informed by some ground verification by CIMA Cordillera 
Azul employees. The dataset was used to identify forested and deforested areas as well as 
areas of bare land23, and where data was unavailable.  
                                                 
23 Bare land can be differentiated from deforested land by the fact that bare land is consistently and 
naturally bare.  
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For the purposes of this study, forest patches encompassing at least 1,000 hectares 
of forest and found in the buffer zone of PNCAZ were selected and isolated in individual 
raster files of equal spatial extent (i.e. each raster file isolated a single forest patch). In 
total, 14 patches were created, with patch sizes ranging from 1,104 to 491,324 hectares 
and a mean patch area of 97,255 hectares.  
Determining Friction & Calculating Cost Distance 
Models for landscape connectivity (in this case, forest connectivity) often involve 
a modification of cost distance and least cost path, using friction as the cost source. For 
the purposes of this study, friction was calculated on a scale of 1-20 for each pixel within 
the study area. Pixels representing asphalt and market centers were assigned a value 20 
times more costly than those representing intact forest patches (as based on Arima et al. 
2007), with all other areas placed along the spectrum between the two (Table 5).  
 
Description Friction 
Asphalt road 20 
Market Centers  20 
Huallaga 18 
Areas within 0.5 km of asphalt road 18 
Other communities 16 
Areas within 0.5-1 km of asphalt road 16 
Reinforced roads (afirmado) 14 
Areas within 0.5 km of reinforced road (afirmado) 12 
Areas within 0.5-1 km of reinforced road (afirmado) 10 
Unreinforced road (sin afirmar) 10 
Areas within 0.5 km of unreinforced road (sin afirmar) 8 
Dirt roads (trocha) 6 
Unforested/Deforested 6 
Small rivers 6 
Areas within 0.5 km of dirt roads (trocha) or deforested areas 2 
Intact forest patches  1 
Table 5: Friction values for the forest connectivity model.  
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Corridor Model 
Once friction costs were established, a cost distance function was run 14 times—
each using the friction raster as the basis for the cost and a unique forest patch raster as 
the origin or source. To create corridors, the results from two of these cost distance 
functions were selected (i.e. cost distance for a pair of forest patches) and the values for 
each pixel in both rasters were summed. This resulted in a new raster indicating the 
cumulative cost, in both directions, between the two patches for any given pixel. In total, 
91 unique forest patch pair corridors were generated within the AOI with average 
cumulative corridor costs of 40,272 per 100-meter pixel (min = 100; max = 150,033).  
The 91 cumulative cost rasters were separated into quantiles of equal area using 
GIS operations. These operations were performed twice—once to yield a map of the 
lowest one percent of cost pixels (100 quantiles) and once to yield a map of the lowest 
five percent of cost pixels (20 quantiles). These lowest cost corridors were then joined 
into single binary rasters, respectively, where a value of 1 indicates the pixel is included 
in at least one least-cost corridor and a value of 0 indicates that it is not. This 
methodology was selected because it maintains equal weight for each corridor, regardless 
of corridor distance, patch size, or cost differences for crossing between different patch 
pairs, while also maintaining a reasonable level of scrutiny (i.e. a reasonable sample 
size).  
Deforestation Probability 
To ensure that the proxy for economic rent (i.e. freight cost) is robust, two separate 
methods were used and compared. The first accounts for the distance that a given plot of 
land lays from roads and waterways (also used for transport) through simple Euclidean 
distance calculations. The second uses field data and spatial analysis to identify land and 
infrastructure classifications and assign them unique friction values, which are then used 
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to calculate a given plot’s cost distance to market.  These two methods attempt to account 
for the same effect and thus were never used in combination. Results from both are 
compared in the following chapter (Table 9). A more thorough explanation of the 
methods for calculating cost distance is given below. 
Calculating Cost Distance 
Calculating cost distance requires both a friction raster—indicating the relative 
difficulty of crossing each pixel within the study area—as well as a source raster—the 
pixels (locations) to which the least accumulated cost distance is calculated.  For this 
study, the friction raster was created using road condition and water bodies (CIMA), 
forest and non-forest areas (Hansen et al. 2013) and data on freight cost (field work, 
summer 2015; see left panel, Figure 7). The source raster used market centers as the 
source pixels of interest (red dots in Figure 7).  
To determine a relationship between road condition, distance and cost, 
information from field interviews was processed into records of freight cost. Given that 
these records were obtained through interviews, most involved transit from a given 
community to a point of sale—typically a larger community or market center—rather 
than travel along a particular isolated section of road. Because of this, the records often 
involve multiple kinds of road condition and may also be repeated in various interviews 
with various community members. To determine unique records, each instance of 
reported freight cost was recorded in terms of the start and end point of the journey, as 
well as any important deviations that were noted (e.g. if there are two routes between the 
start and end point, the interviewee indicated which route they were discussing). To 
eliminate repeat observations of the same route and cost, only one record of this route 
was utilized in the linear regression that followed. This processing revealed 81 unique 
records of freight cost.  
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The unique records of freight cost were processed alongside data on distance 
obtained from a GIS to determine approximately how many kilometers of road along the 
travelled route were asphalted (asfaltado), reinforced (afirmado), without reinforcement 
(sin afirmar), and dirt (trocha) respectively. A linear regression was then performed 
using total freight cost for the segment (soles/sack/km) as the dependent variable, and 
employing the four road categories as independent variables, as follows:  
 + εi 
Linear regression results were significant for all road types except asphalt (p-
value = 0.17) and indicated a positive intercept coefficient as well. This coefficient 
indicates the fixed costs required to travel, regardless of distance. In this case, the 
intercept coefficient was equal to 7.84 soles per sack per kilometer (Table 6).  
While units for the regression were soles per sack per kilometer (1 sack = 60-65 
kilos; Table 6), these were converted to soles per sack per meter for the friction raster, to 
maintain consistency with the pixel resolution (100 sq. meters) (Table 7). 
 
Road Type Coefficient (SE) N Unit 
Intercept  7.84 (1.77)***   









Dirt (Trocha) 0.8788 (0.18)*** 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
Table 6: Results from freight cost linear regression.  
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Once friction values were obtained for each road type, these values were applied 
to the road raster (i.e. each pixel designated as trocha was assigned the friction value for 
trocha, and so on). Forest and non-forested areas were also assigned friction costs, as 
were water features. For water features, friction values were based on a previous study 
using information from Wildlife Conservation Society in the nearby region of Loreto 
(Arima 2016).  Those areas not designated as forest, road or water were given a friction 
value equal to “trocha”. Forested pixels were given a friction value 20 times higher, as 
according to previous work (see Pinto & Keitt 2009 and Arima et al. 2007) (Table 7). 
Once the friction and source rasters were complete, they were used to run a cost-distance 





















 (% Aoi)24 
Units 





Smaller Rivers 0.0000750 Class IV Rivers - WCS 6,284 km2 (9.39%) 
Trocha 0.0008788  Field data regressions 1,672 km2 (2.5%) 
Sin Afirmar 0.0004990  Field data regressions 259 km2 (0.39%) 
Afirmado 0.0001247  Field data regressions 818 km2 (1.22%) 
Asfaltado 0.0000929  Field data regressions 259 km2 (0.25%) 
No Bosque  
(= Trocha) 
0.0008788  Field data regressions; 
Arima et al. 2007 
7,261 km2 (10.85%) 
Bosque 0.001858 20x higher than 
asfaltado (Arima et al. 
2007) 
49,451 km2 (73.88%) 
Table 7: Friction values assigned for cost distance function. 
 
Figure 7: Cost distance modeling.  
                                                 
24 Pixel counts and percentages were calculated including only  the northwest buffer zone of Cordillera 
Azul National Park and excluding the park itself (nearly all forested pixels) as well as all areas outside the 
buffer zone, with the exception of the Huallaga River and major roadways (used for transport to market). If 
we include the park, 977,287 pixels in the study area remain forested. If process the study area simply as 
forested or unforested, 94,216 pixels appear as unforested—these include those pixels where roads and 
communities occur, etc. 
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Spatially Explicit Deforestation Probability 
For the deforestation probability model, each raster (2-D matrix) was converted to 
a column vector variable while their location was tracked through an index ID number to 
ensure that each variable represented the same number of observations of the same spatial 
extent. A logistic regression was then run on the matrix including only those values 
(pixels) of interest for each variable according to the AOI matrix. For the purposes of the 
logistic regression, the control variable of soil was parsed out into 32 binary dummy 
































 Dependent Forest Cover Hansen et al. 2014 Binary N/A 










See below Continuous 
Negative 
Independent REP  See above  Continuous Positive 




Elevation ASTER GDEM  Continuous 
Controls 
Soil Type Hengl et al. 
2014 
Binary 
TRMM TRMM 3B43 Continuous 
Park CIMA Binary 
Table 8: Key parameters used in the deforestation probability model. 
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Chapter 5: Results 
DEFORESTATION PROBABILITY MODEL 
As explained in the methods, the deforestation probability model took two 
forms—one which employed a cost distance variable as a proxy for freight cost, and 
another which employed Euclidean distance to roads and waterways. The logit regression 
involving the cost distance variable resulted in a final log likelihood of -233,130.1 with a 
pseudo R2 equal to 0.0913. Of the seven original variables, nearly all displayed a highly 
significant (p<0.001) impact on the probability of whether forest is present or not. The 
only exceptions are two soil types, two of which—ferralsols and nitisols—have p-values 
equal to 0.47 and 0.96 respectively (Table 9). Of the explanatory variables, three 
displayed a negative relationship with the latent variable. Of these, cost distance 
exhibited by far the largest estimated impact (z = -143.23). Each 1 sol increase in cost 
from market (equivalent to 11.11 km on an asphalted road or 1.06 km on a dirt road) was 
estimated to decrease the latent variable by 0.3281 (Table 9). Taking logistic(y*), the cost 
distance model yielded deforestation probabilities (p̂) ranging from 0.002 to 0.922 per 
pixel, with a mean value of 0.22 (std. dev. = 0.1309). The spatial nature of these values is 
displayed in Figure 8, below.  
In addition to this first logit regression, a second logit was run using Euclidean 
distance to roads and waterways. This model used the same number of observations as 
the previous model but replaced the cost distance variable with Euclidean distance to 
roads and waterways. The end result was a new equation where  = 1 (deforested) if  
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This second logit regression resulted in a final log likelihood of -224,853.21 with 
a pseudo R2 equal to 0.1235. Of the seven variables, four had a highly significant 
(p<0.001) impact on the probability of whether forest was present or not—namely, 
EDroads, EDwater, Slope, and Elevation. The non-significant effect of population (REP) 
is most likely due to the fact that both REP and EDroads use distance as a key component 
of their construction, and may be picking up the same effect, at least in part. Additionally, 
while the REP variable showed a positive effect in the cost distance deforestation model, 
it exhibited a non-significant, negative relationship with the latent variable in the 
Euclidean distance model due to its overlap with EDroads (Table 9). 
Nearly all of the explanatory variables utilized in the Euclidean distance model 
displayed a negative relationship with the latent variable; the exceptions being several 
soil types and the precipitation variable. Of those variables that exhibited a negative 
relationship, EDroads exhibited the largest estimated impact by far (z = -137.50), 
followed by Elevation (z = -49.57), Slope (z = -33.15) and ED water (z = -21.37). 
However, compared with the cost distance model, the impacts of these variables seem to 
be much smaller. Each 1 kilometer increase in the distance from market is estimated to 
decrease the latent variable by 0.0004. A 1 kilometer increase in the distance from 
















Pseudo R2 - 0.0913 0.1235 
Cost Distance Soles per sack per m2 -0.33 (2.29E-3)*** - 
EDroads Km - -4.77E-4  (3.47E-6)*** 
EDwater Km - -1.58E-4 (7.44E-6)*** 
Relative Effect of 
Population (REP) 
Ratio of growth in 
population/distance 
from population 
0.23 (0.02)*** -0.02 (0.02) 
Slope Degrees slope -0.05 (6.60E-4)*** -0.02 (6.74E-4)*** 
Elevation Meters above sea level -3.27E-4 (1.62E-5)*** -8.16E-4 (1.64E-5)*** 
Soil 
 




0.80 (0.03)*** 1.05 (0.03)*** 
Ferralsols -0.00 (0.01) -0.13 (0.01)*** 
Gleysols 0.21 (0.03)*** 0.39 (0.03)*** 
Histosols 0.81 (0.20)*** 0.50 (0.18)** 
Kastanozems 0.07 (0.01)*** 0.01 (0.01) 
Leptosols -0.33 (0.03)*** -0.17 (0.03)*** 
Luvisols 0.14 (0.03)*** 0.27 (0.03)*** 
Nitisols -0.28 (0.39) 3.35 (0.40)*** 
Solonchaks 1.49 (0.02)*** 1.80 (0.02)*** 
Umbrisols -0.25 (0.04)*** -0.41(0.04)*** 
Vertisols 0.46 (0.22)** 0.57 (0.22)** 
Acrisols 2.87 (0.40)*** 3.05 (0.40)*** 
Precipitation (TRMM) 
Average mm/year per 
pixel from 1998-2013 
+2.45E-4 (0.03)  3.11E-5 (1.86E-5)* 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001.   




Figure 8: Deforestation probabilities across the AOI.  
While the two deforestation probability models employed by this study indicated 
many statistically significant effects, this statistical significance may be due to the study’s 
large sample size. To understand the practical significance of these results—i.e. the 
impact of each variable on deforestation probability—marginal effects are likely a more 
useful tool.  
Table 10 displays the average marginal effects for each variable employed by 
both the cost distance and Euclidean distance models. Surprisingly, soil type displays 
some of the largest effects. However, these effects are likely minimized by the low 
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percentage of most soil types within the AOI. While there may be an exception in the 
case of Acrisols, which represent both 47% of the AOI and have a larger marginal effect 
(0.56 and 0.55) on deforestation probability, these are clay-rich soils known for low 
fertility and toxic amounts of aluminum. Thus the marginal effect may be due more to 
prevalence than to benefits for agriculture.  
Following soil types, the cost distance variable displays one of the largest effects. 
Each one point decrease in cost distance results in a 5% increase in the probability that an 
area will be deforested. This is followed by the REP variable, where each one point 
increase in the index results in a 4% increase in the probability that an area will be 
deforested. The marginal effects of these two variables within the cost distance model are 
larger than the effect of any (non-soil) individual variable in the Euclidean distance 
model. Within the Euclidean model, slope exhibits the largest marginal effect (-3.42E-3), 
followed by the relative effect of population (Table 10). Though these marginal effects 
may seem small, it is important to note that the deforestation probabilities across the 
study area are also rather small, though accurate (mean = 0.22, which closely 















Variable Cost Distance  Euclidean Distance 
Cost Distance   -0.05 (3.42E-4)*** - 
EDroads - -7.31E-5 (5.09E-7)*** 
EDwater - -2.44E-5 (1.14E-6)*** 
Relative Effect of 
Population (REP) 
0.04 (3.59E-3) -3.05E-3 (3.30E-3) 
Slope -0.71E-2 (1.02E-3)*** -3.42E-3 (1.03E-4)*** 
Elevation -0.50E-4 (2.54E-6)*** -1.25E-4 (2.50E-6)*** 
Soil   
Cambisols 0.14 (5.90E-3)*** 0.20 (5.94E-3)*** 
Ferralsols 7.17E-5 (1.49E-3) -0.02 (1.45E-3)*** 
Gleysols 0.04 (4.40E-3)*** 0.07 (4.64E-3)*** 
Histosols 0.15 (0.04)*** 0.09 (3.33E-2)** 
Kastanozems 0.01 (1.67E-3)*** 2.26E-3 (1.64E-3) 
Leptosols -0.05 (4.42E-3)*** -0.03 (4.80E-3)*** 
Luvisols 0.02 (4.71E-3)*** 0.04 (4.80E-3)*** 
Nitisols -0.04 (5.27E-2) 0.58 (0.04)*** 
Solonchaks 0.29 (4.83E-3)*** 0.34 (4.46E-3)*** 
Umbrisols -0.4 (5.90E-3)*** -0.06 (5.49E-3)*** 
Vertisols 0.08 (4.08E-2)* 0.10 (0.04)** 
Acrisols 0.56 (6.04E-2)*** 0.55 (0.05)*** 
Precipitation (TRMM) 0.39E-4 (3.00E-6)*** 5.19E-6 (2.89E-6)* 
*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.001 
Table 10: Marginal effects of the deforestation probability variables.  
While the Euclidean distance model resulted in a higher pseudo R2 than the model 
employing cost distance and may at first seem to be the stronger analysis, it was 
ultimately excluded from further analysis due to two main factors. First, the EDroads and 
REP variables both employ Euclidean distance as a factor and are likely producing a 
confounding effect. Second, and possibly because of this effect, the Euclidean distance 
model indicates a highly unlikely negative relationship between REP and deforestation. 
Considering that distance to the community is the denominator for the REP variable, this 
means that deforestation probability is expected to decrease the closer a given land parcel 
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is to a populated, growing community center. Given these contradictions, the cost 
distance model is used for comparative analyses instead.  
FOREST CONNECTIVITY CORRIDORS 
As briefly prefaced in the methods, a least cost corridor function was run for each 
of the 91 unique forest patch pairs generated by this analysis. GIS operations were then 
used to select the lowest cost quintile from each of these individual corridors, and to 
aggregate a certain bottom percentage into one, equally-weighted raster. These operations 
were performed twice—once to yield a map of the lowest one percent of cost pixels (100 
quantiles) and once to yield the lowest five percent of cost pixels (20 quantiles).  
Given that the AOI for this study, corridor calculations were constrained to the 
buffer zone boundary. Of the 481,622 100-meter pixels in the buffer zone, 404,116 pixels 
(83.9% of AOI) are prioritized under a model that considers the bottom five percent in 
terms of pixel costs for each of the 91 corridors (remember that the lower the cost to 
traverse a pixel, the more valuable it is assumed to be, in this study, for a conservation 
corridor connecting forest patches). When the model is restricted further to include only 
the bottom one percent, the number of pixels shrinks to 215,974 pixels (44.8% of the 
study area) (Table 11). The spatial nature of this pattern is show in Figure 9, below. 
 
Area No. of Pixels % of AOI Forested Cells Unforested Cells  
AOI 481,622 100% 373,447 (77.5%) 108,175 (22.5%) 
Corridors     
     Bottom 5%  404,116 83.9% 323,039 (79.9%) 81,077 (20.1%) 
     Bottom 1%  215,974 44.8% 181,950 (84.2%) 34,024 (15.7%) 
Table 11: Results from landscape connectivity corridor analysis.  
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Figure 9: Top 5% and top 1% of connectivity areas across the AOI. 
Given that a model prioritizing the bottom 5% of each corridor results in a vast 
majority of the area of interest (83.9%), this broader model was excluded from further 
analysis and comparisons and only the bottom 1% model was used.  
CARBON 
As described previously, data on aboveground carbon was obtained from the 
Carnegie Airborne Observatory at Stanford University (Asner et al. 2014). Within the 
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AOI, aboveground carbon density measurements range from 0.31 Mg C ha−1 to 146.74 
Mg C ha−1, with an average density of 56.10 Mg C ha−1. Uncertainty in the area ranges 
from 0.32 to 30.81 with an average of 20.33 and a standard deviation of 1.57.  
To identify areas of priority in terms of aboveground carbon, the top 1% and the 
top 20% of aboveground carbon density values were isolated. Of the 481,622 100-meter 
pixels in the buffer zone, 97,021 pixels are prioritized under a model that isolates the top 
20% of pixels in terms of aboveground carbon density. These pixels have an average 
ACD of 110.68 Mg C ha−1, and an average uncertainty of 25.79. When this model is 
restricted to include only the top 1%, the number of pixels shrinks to 4,380 pixels with an 
average ACD of 130.85 and an average uncertainty of 26.96 (Table 12, Figure 10). 
 
Table 12: Results from aboveground carbon density (ACD) prioritization.  
  ACD (MgC ha−1) Uncertainty   
Area Pixels Min Max Mean  Min Max Mean SD 
AOI 481,622 0.31 146.74 56.10  0.32 30.81 20.33 1.57 
Top 20%  97,021 98.00 146.74 110.68  25.97 30.81 25.79 6.69 
Top 1%  4,380 128.00 146.74 130.85  26.92 30.81 26.96 7.68 
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Figure 10: Top 20% and 1% areas in terms of ACD.  
COMPARATIVE RESULTS 
Spatial intersections of the three models were conducted using the middle most 
quintiles of deforestation probability, the top 20% of ACD and the lowest 1% of corridors 
as these yielded samples of relatively similar sizes (Table 13). Given that the model for 
aboveground carbon density isolated the lowest number of pixels (97,021), this model 
acted as the limiting factor in determining the maximum number of pixels that could 




Model No. of Pixels % AOI Selected Areas  
ACD 97,021 20.0% Top 20% 
Deforestation Probability 191,998 40.0% Middle 3rd and 4th quintiles 25 
Forest Connectivity 215,974 44.8% Bottom 1% 
Table 13: Results from all three schemes of conservation priority.  
Spatial intersections were performed for all three models, as well as all 2-model 
combinations. Results vary substantially. Figure 11 shows the number of pixels isolated 
by each intersection, the maximum possible (97,021) and the proportion of forested/not 
forested pixels. The intersection of all three criteria resulted in 11,894 pixels. In contrast 
the intersection of just carbon density and corridor areas resulted in the a set of 38,695 
pixels, just carbon and deforestation resulted in 22,297 pixels, and just corridor and 
deforestation priority areas resulted in the isolation of a striking 91,235 pixels. Maps 
showing the spatial configurations of all four comparisons are shown in Figure 12a-d.  
 
 
Figure 11 Forest and non-forest in the four priority schemes.  








Chapter 6:  Discussion 
This thesis implements three sets of models, as based on aboveground carbon 
density, forest connectivity and spatially explicit deforestation probability, in an effort to 
inform conservation initiatives in the buffer zone of Cordillera Azul National Park, Peru. 
In doing so, it provides valuable information for conservation planners, park officials and 
investors. The discussion below addresses the nature of these spatial configurations, and 
implications for cost effectiveness, additionality, and tradeoffs. It concludes with a 
discussion of computational and contextual challenges and constraints, followed by 
opportunities for future research.  
SPATIAL NATURES 
Forest carbon offsets are a popular tool for conservation finance. However, while 
carbon offsets may help reduce carbon dioxide emissions, priority areas for carbon 
offsets may also differ spatially from other key conservation objectives. As seen in 
Figures 8, 9, and 10, each of the individual criteria isolate a substantial subsection of the 
AOI (Figure 12a-c). However, when one attempts to strike a compromise between all 
three criteria, the priority conservation area shrinks substantially (Figure 12d).  
An intersection of the three prioritization schemes results in an overlap of just 
11,894 pixels. This is under 3% of the area of interest and represents 12.3% of the 
potential compromise area.26 If all three objectives are to be pursued, these pixels 
represent the priority areas for investment. However, while 94.2% of this area was still 
classified as forested as of 2013, thus offering opportunities for conservation and/or 
                                                 
26 Remember that the number of pixels under a scheme that meets all three criteria is limited to the pixel 
count in the smallest model (97,021 pixels according to the ACD 20% priority model). 
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offset programs, these pixels are also scattered across the AOI. A main cluster stretches 
from Chazuta northward, between the Huallaga River and the park’s northernmost peak, 
while smaller clusters are scattered around the outskirts of Yanayacu, and along the park 
boundary in the central AOI.  
Given this sparse distribution, a strategy focused on isolating these areas as stand-
alone targets may in fact be less effectual than anticipated. Specifically, the small overall 
size and largely dispersed nature of this pattern suggests that a conservation strategy that 
prioritizes only those areas that meet all three criteria may paradoxically undermine one 
of them—forest connectivity. To compensate for this fact, conservation initiatives 
following this scheme would be wise to focus on restoration of nearby areas or the 
creation of a landscape mosaic that is more environmentally friendly. For instance, 
farmers could be encouraged to grow cacao, coffee or other agroforestry crops in the 
surrounding area.  
An additional strategy lies in the community partnerships CIMA has made. Since 
the early 2000s, CIMA has been actively working with communities in the park buffer 
zone to establish communal living norms, community values, and conservation strategies. 
However, while many of these partnerships have been successful, CIMA staff have also 
reported difficulty with establishing and maintaining partnerships with the area’s growing 
migrant population. Given that many of these smaller clusters center around just such 
areas—Sangamayo and Porvenir are two examples—devising new strategies to 
incorporate these stakeholders will be an important step. This is true even for those areas 
that have yet to be occupied (such as up north). Due to the high rates of inmigration, the 
buffer zone’s social landscape can change frequently and dramatically. Any conservation 
strategy based on this intersection would need to be paired with a modification of 
CIMA’s current methods and techniques, to further incorporate diverse stakeholders and 
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Figure 13 The larger landscape of a tri-criteria conservation plan. 
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In addition to adjusting their community base, CIMA Cordillera Azul and other 
conservation practitioners could also expand the priority criteria to include all areas that 
meet two of the criteria, rather than all three. In the case of Cordillera Azul National 
Park, a model that prioritizes both high aboveground carbon density and deforestation 
probability is the one most likely to be used for a carbon offset program. This is due to 
the fact that for a carbon offset project to be verified, it must prove both high above 
ground carbon density and additionality.  
Figure 14 shows the spatial nature of (a) a conservation scheme that prioritizes 
high ACD and moderate deforestation probability, alongside (b) one that prioritizes 
deforestation and forest connectivity corridors. While there is some overlap between the 
two, one can also observe that the latter not only prioritizes more area (91,235 pixels 
versus 22,297 in the former model), but also allows the model to protect connective 
pathways with PNCAZ itself.  
 
 
Figure 14 Deforestation and carbon vs. deforestation and connectivity. 
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COST EFFECTIVENESS & TRADEOFFS 
By assigning priority to those pixels that fall within the top 20% of aboveground 
carbon density and are also within the 3rd or 4th quintile in terms of deforestation 
probability, the first map above (Figure 14a) isolates pixels that are expected to 
experience moderate deforestation risk, and are thus eligible for carbon dioxide emission 
reductions (i.e. offsets). Because these pixels are not among the highest in terms of 
deforestation risk, they are also unlikely to represent the areas of highest profitability and 
are thus more cost effective for carbon offset investors and conservation practitioners to 
target. 
However, while this model may be the best in terms of expected cost-
effectiveness, it does differ spatially from forest connectivity, a factor that should not be 
overlooked. Maintaining landscape connectivity is a key strategy for conserving species 
diversity under changing climatic conditions (Bernazzi et al. 2012, Staudinger et al. 2012, 
Gilbert-Norton et al. 2010, Heller & Zavaleta 2009, Tischendorf & Fahrig 2000). While 
historically species have used large-scale movement to adapt to climatic changes 
(Martinez-Meyer et al. 2004; Parmesan & Yohe 2003), species today are expected to face 
larger migration distances (Schloss et al. 2012) across larger anthropogenic barriers 
(Sanderson et al. 2002) than species of the past. Species may also be required to migrate 
faster (Malcolm et al. 2002),27 adapting to novel climates that develop at the same time 
that other climates disappear (Loarie et al. 2009, Williams & Jackson 2007).  
As of 2006, altitudinal or longitudinal range shifts had already been observed in 
over 1,000 species as of 2006 (Parmesan 2006). Though PNCAZ encompasses a large 
altitudinal gradient (approx. 200-2400 meters), tropical montane ecosystems are expected 
                                                 
27 Williams & Jackson (2007) predict that novel climates will develop primarily in the tropics and 
subtropics, whereas disappearing climates will concentrate in tropical montane regions and the poleward 
portions of continents. 
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to have a harder time adjusting to shifts in climatic gradients (Feeley et al. 2013, Feeley 
et al. 2011, Feeley & Silman 2010, Foster 2001). If climate change continues, the 
protection provided by the park may not be enough.28 After all, PNCAZ and similar areas 
exist within larger environments of human disturbance (Laurance et al. 2012, Chazdon et 
al. 2009, Lovejoy 2006). Species within these areas may attempt to shift their range in 
line with climate transitions only to find that their movement is inhibited by the spread of 
anthropogenic land use in the surrounding area (Burrows et al. 2014, Nuñez et al. 2013, 
Coristine & Kerr 2011).29 Deforestation, roads and frontier communities are all barriers 
to connectivity that these species would have to face (CIMA 2012, 2013; SCSGS 2013).  
Considering current migration barriers, and the park’s high rates of endemism, 
landscape connectivity will likely play a large role in future climate change susceptibility. 
However, while forest carbon offset markets have helped establish the three criteria of 
additionality, leakage, and permanence in terms of carbon, little to no work has been 
done to classify and validate the services that forest connectivity offers.  
IMPORTANT CONSIDERATIONS 
REDD+ and similar offset mechanisms operate on the assumption that by 
generating alternate employment options and new income opportunities, they can reduce 
deforestation pressures at the forest frontier. One common determinant of an area’s 
eligibility for a carbon program is the area’s capacity to experience reduced deforestation 
at a low cost (Andersen et al. 2012). However, estimating these costs can be difficult. 
Changes in landscape can be attributed to a combination of factors, including 
                                                 
28 Under climate change, some species declines are expected even in the absence of dispersal barriers 
(Pereira et al. 2010). One recent study by Ceballos and colleagues (2015) has indicated that current 
extinction rates vastly exceed natural background rates. According to this data, the authors suggest that we 
may be entering a sixth mass extinction (Ceballos et al. 2015). In biodiversity hotspots—such as tropical 
Peru—extinction rates of endemic species are predicted to be even worse (Malcolm et al. 2006).   
29 See Dutta et al. (2015)’s “Connecting the dots: mapping habitat connectivity for tigers in central India” 
for a more specific example on this. 
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environmental heterogeneity and variability (Gustafson 1998, Turner et al. 1995), 
population growth, demographic transitions, technological innovations or political 
developments (Rounsevell et al. 2003, Walker et al. 2002, Stoate et al. 2001), as well as 
resultant economic conditions (e.g., Irwin & Geoghegan 2001, Kaimowitz & Angelsen 
1998). Because of this, at least two scales are at work. The first, a microscale, is highly 
affected by the objectives of individuals acting on the landscape (i.e. their economic 
incentives or cultural preferences). The second, a macro-scale, stems from the context in 
which these decisions are made (Brown et al. 2012, Geist and Lambin 2002 & 2001, 
Kaimowitz & Angelsen 1998).  
While this study attempts to address the latter, little information was available to 
appropriately explore the former. Accessibility to markets (i.e. freight costs) was used as 
a proxy for the spatial variation in prices; forest structural connectivity was used as a 
proxy for process connectivity. Given this level of analysis, exact opportunity costs, 
household and ecosystem level data, social and cultural differences, and time series 
information are incomplete. Additionally, any true measure of connectivity must be based 
on movement of an organism through a landscape. Since this study was unable to 
incorporate many of these components, they would undoubtedly be useful for future 
research. Implications for this study are briefly addressed below.  
Caveats of Economic Rent 
While the deforestation probability model presented by this study attempts to 
capture the economic landscape, several caveats should be noted.  
First, by not employing actual market prices for products, this model cannot 
calculate exact opportunity costs for a given land use at a given land parcel. However, 
had current market prices been used to calculate deforestation probabilities, the analysis 
would have been fixed to a specific set of market conditions at a specific time (i.e. the 
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present). Costs of reducing deforestation would have been assumed to be equal to the 
current value of the land for whatever production is occurring.30 By using freight costs to 
approximate deforestation probability, the values determined by this study instead form a 
type of index. Each value holds true and remains adjustable as long as prices fluctuations 
for different market goods do not change relative to each other.  
Second, by using road location and condition as a factor in determining 
deforestation, the model also runs the risk of endogeneity as road location may actually 
be influenced by the location of agricultural production. Chomitz and Grey tested for this 
possibility in their 1996 study, and found evidence of the endogeneity of roads. Although 
this study controlled for a rich set of variables that may be correlated with road placement 
(e.g. slope, elevation, soil type), road endogeneity cannot be ruled out completely and the 
estimate of the influence of accessibility on deforestation may be overstated. 
Third and finally, the area of interest presented by this study is still affected by at 
least two unlawful forces: illicit land grabs and the production of illicit crops (see 
Appendix for more information). Rather than exhibiting the traditional model of 
economic rent, which exhibits a positive correlation with proximity to market (see 
Figures 2 and 3, Chapter 3), illicit activities follow a slightly different pattern. In the case 
of illicit crops and land grabs, areas of high rent are those out of sight rather than those 
centrally located. This is due to that fact that illicit activities require areas where there is 
the highest chance to avoid detection (i.e. the lowest chance of being seen). Thus, the 
most profitable areas are those absconded from the view of roads, markets, communities, 
perhaps even within patches of intact forest. Figure 15 illustrates how this speculative 
inverse relationship might look.  
                                                 
30 i.e. if the land is currently a logging concession, cost of reducing deforestation would be equal to the 
opportunity cost of not logging, or the profits from the logging itself. 
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Figure 15: Deforestation, rent and visibility in the case of illicit crops.   
Limits of the Landscape Level 
Considering the caveats above, models based on landscape-level factors could be 
greatly improved by additional information. For instance, while the deforestation model’s 
basis in economic rent and deforestation probability attempts to address the 
heterogeneous nature of the landscape, the model also overlooks important micro-scale 
information. For the purpose of this study, the explanation below divides this information 
into two categories: (1) agents, defined here as decision-making individuals that are 
acting upon the landscape, (2) broader contextual information on the area.  
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Agents 
In a large and/or heterogeneous region, different agents may be active in different 
areas. These dynamics, whether among agents or between agents and their environment, 
are important components of land use and land cover change (Geist and Lambin 2001), 
and ultimately add spatial complexity to any attempt at causal explanation (Walker et al. 
2002).  
For instance, if agroforestry crops prove profitable, a farmer may decide to 
expand their farming operation. This can either occur through increased production on 
the same amount of area, or by expanding crop production onto new tracts of land. 
Additionally, while models may predict deforestation will occur in a certain pattern given 
this profitability, the actions of neighbors and communities can impact the land use 
decisions of individuals in unexpected ways. As one neighbor witnesses another profiting 
(or losing money), their land use decisions may change.  
Programs can have a similar effect. For instance, carbon offset programs that 
displace previous landowners (e.g. subsistence farmers, cattle ranchers), may result in 
indirect land use change as the displaced individuals colonize new areas for cattle and 
farming. In carbon market jargon, this effect is classified as “leakage” and forms an 
important criteria for program validity (see Chapter 3 for definition).  
Contextual Information 
As described above, while landscape-level models for conservation may make 
priority areas easier to identify, they can also overlook important local variations. In the 
case of the forest connectivity model, this overlooked information is the difference 
between structural connectivity and process connectivity. While forest intactness and 
patch connectivity are important components of ecosystem functioning, species 
abundance and distribution, and ecosystem functioning are all equally, if not more, vital. 
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Without habitat level information, these landscape models can only broadly and roughly 
approximate connectivity (Tischendorf 2000). 
In similar fashion, economic rent may not directly model the actual land-use 
transitions of an area. The buffer zone of PNCAZ is in many ways an agricultural 
frontier. While market prices help determine the opportunity costs for standing forests 
and incentives for clearing (Bowman et al. 2012, Poffenberger 2009, Chomitz et al. 
2005), land markets and the social and cultural factors affecting them also have a large 
impact.  
Despite the fact that land tenure, titles, and records are often scarce,31 land 
transactions occur regularly in the Cordillera Azul buffer zone. A recent study near 
Cordillera Azul reported that despite only 2% of respondents holding a registered land 
title, over 300 land transactions were reported. While landowners in the area likely 
experience higher risk due to the lack of land tenure (and thus expect lower profits) 
recent transactions indicate that the cost of purchasing land rose by 11-26% each year 
between 2003 and 2013. In some cases, lack of land tenure may have even encouraged 
these sales, as informal purchase agreements between the buyer and seller helped create a 
paper trail to indicate ownership (Holland & Coomes in review).  
While many of these sales occur legally, there is also the aforementioned 
component of land trafficking. In the Cordillera Azul buffer zone, land traffickers often 
travel from San Martin to the Sierra region to sell the land, which Serrano buyers then 
relocate their households to claim. Because of this trend, in-migration to the area is 
increasing. A recent study on land markets in the area found that 92% of respondents 
were born elsewhere in Peru, and 60% had arrived in the last ten years (Holland & 
                                                 
31 Of the agricultural land in the entire department of San Martin, only about 30% has a registered land title 
(Conservation International 2011, Gobierno Regional San Martin 2009). In the northwest buffer zone of 
Cordillera Azul National Park, this percentage is even lower (CIMA 2012). 
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Coomes in review). 32 Thus, while economic rent is likely a key factor in modelling 
deforestation, there are likely numerous other factors underlying the “who”, “where”, 
“why” and “how” of land market transactions.  
Given that many of these social and cultural characteristics vary at the household 
level, failure to incorporate survey-based information about household and community 
structures can also create specification bias (Walker et al. 2002). For instance, past 
studies indicate that farmers identify opportunity costs in vastly different ways. While 
some farmers identify the minimum compensation to not deforest as almost twice their 
net agricultural revenues (Leguia et al. 2011), others indicate a willingness to pay to 
conserve forest (Gomez et al. 2013).  
These discrepancies also have large implications for the cost effectiveness of 
carbon programs and may reflect larger implementation challenges. For farmers and 
landowners who are not financially indifferent, offset mechanisms that pay them equal to 
their opportunity cost (i.e. that provide a financial incentive equal to what they would 
have received using the land business-as-usual) result in a net benefit experienced that is 
functionally zero (Andersen et al. 2012). In such cases, positive benefits to land owners 
only arise when they are paid more than their opportunity cost of not using the land.  
Additionally, despite the time farmers gain by receiving carbon payments—and 
thereby, additional potential income—concerns about food security, self-sufficiency, or a 
preference for familiar agricultural revenues can cause farmers to prefer agricultural work 
over equal income from forest conservation (Andersen et al. 2012). Land owners 
accustomed to one form of land use may perceive alternative forms as risky, thus 
requiring further payment to offset their uncertainty or justify the time spent learning new 
                                                 
32 In a place like the Huallaga Valley, with high rates of in-migration and some swathes of intact, 
unclaimed forest, tenure of new lands is also often established by the slashing and burning of forest—i.e. 
tenure by deforestation. This is an important piece of examining environmental impacts and will be 
discussed in detail later.  
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practices. In contrast, willingness to pay can stem from farmers’ awareness of, and 
appreciation for, preserved forest and the ecosystem services it provides (Gomez et al. 
2013).33 
An understanding of these beliefs and preferences is important for the appropriate 
analysis of any conservation priority model. Depending on local conditions, high 
compensation demands may be the result of farmers underestimating their labor costs and 
thus overestimating net revenues, indicating larger social issues. In addition, firms that 
invest money without such knowledge may be unintentionally selecting one stakeholder 
over another. While the model for deforestation probability selects those areas that are 
expected to be most cost effective, the who of these areas remains a mystery.  If based on 
additionality and cost effectiveness alone, financial incentives may overlook community-
run forests that, though highly productive, are not part of a formal market (Griffiths 
2008). In this way, economic influxes from carbon markets have the potential to 
selectively support conventional developments, ultimately harming low-carbon 
livelihoods while doing little for local transitions to a carbon-free economy (Lohmann 
2009).34, 35 
                                                 
33 Research on tenure shows similar contradictions. While some studies indicate that areas with individual 
land titles are more likely to be deforested than communally owned lands or public lands (Andersen et al. 
2012), others point to the fact that in areas where land rights are lacking, deforestation is often a tool to 
establish ownership (Angelsen 1999). 
34 One powerful example of how social inequalities can become reinforced is the use of monoculture oil 
palm plantations in carbon credit projects, which have contributed to the displacement of communities and 
ecosystems in the name of carbon sequestration (Koh and Ghazoul, 2008). 
35 While less relevant for the purposes of this study, one of the most common critiques of carbon markets is 
that they abstract the “where”, “how”, “when” and “by whom” of carbon emissions cuts and may promote a 
set of laissez-faire capitalist ideas (Matulis 2014, Lohmann 2012, Lohmann 2009, Griffiths 2008). By 
making carbon emissions a commodity—and thus a nearly tangible asset to be bartered over—scholars 
assert that carbon markets secure the background conditions necessary for carbon accumulation and 
promote the generation of carbon emissions for trade and commerce (Lohmann 2009). As Lohmann (2009) 
so eloquently states, “climate solutions are then disembedded from history and technology—from whence 
long-term solutions would emerge—and are re-embedded into the realm of economics, trade theories, and 
property law”.  Thus, while commodification may help with quantifying and regulating emissions, the long-
term effects may be something much darker; namely, the reinforcement of business as usual and the stifling 
of any new systems or sparks of innovation. 
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In addition to all challenges outlined above, carbon markets may also have larger, 
society-level impacts. The large sums of money associated with carbon offsets can split 
indigenous peoples’ advocacy movements, dividing those who see carbon as an 
opportunity for advancement from those who see it as an ‘enclosure movement’ (i.e. the 
process to end traditional rights) (Griffiths 2008). Environmentalists may experience 
similar divides, with those in favor of large, Washington-based actors such as 
Conservation International and The Nature Conservancy on one side, and those who see 
REDD as disempowering forest peoples in favor of corporations on the other (Griffiths 
2008). Furthermore, some scholars posit that there is an inherent, inequality of 
opportunity in emissions trading (Page 2012). This can manifest as inequalities of 
bargaining power and has immense implications for the resulting moral relations among 
climate governors of the future (Page 2012).  
FUTURE WORK 
Today, conservation practitioners are faced with the challenge of designing 
financially viable conservation programs that protect biodiversity, mitigate climate 
change, offset deforestation, and contribute to local livelihoods. This is an enormous task 
and one that should not be taken lightly. While this research presents an initial case study 
towards this end, future advances in data will undoubtedly support further research.  
Deforestation literature has long recognized interactions between loggers and 
follow-on farmers (Rudel et al. 2002, Walker 1987) and there is increasing evidence that 
prior development is associated with negative feedbacks (Irwin and Bockstael 2002). 
Constant model parameters can produce misleading R2 values and t-statistics. While time 
series data were limited for this study, incorporating a temporal dimension in the future 
would likely help approximate these effects. Specifically, future models could employ 
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econometric methods for panel analysis to allow a variable relationship between 
independent and dependent variables (Hsiao 1986). 
In addition to methodological progress, the future will also bring higher quality 
data. The SoilGrids data used by this study is set to be released at even higher resolution 
(250m) later this year. In addition, new carbon datasets promise to unlock research 
questions that have been stymied for years by an unknown “where” and “how much” of 
terrestrial carbon (Pelletier et al. 2011). Asner et al. (2014) have already begun to provide 
carbon data at the 1-hectare level. In countries like Peru, which harbor large 
bioenvironmental gradients and undergo rapid land use change, such data is invaluable 
for mitigation and valuation strategies. By providing data at the hectare scale—the 
world’s most common unit of land tenure and an important scale for regulatory 
policies—Asner and colleagues (2014) have opened the door for future merging of the 




Chapter 7:  Conclusion 
Within the 2011-2016 Master Plan for Cordillera Azul National Park is a vision 
for the park’s future. By the year 2028, the goal is that PNCAZ will be a national 
protected area that wholly conserves its biological diversity, is participatory managed, is 
financially sustainable, and supports the betterment of quality of life in neighboring 
communities.36 To do so, the PNCAZ and its current governing bodies—namely, CIMA 
Cordillera Azul—will need to find ways to maximize multiple criteria for conservation. 
In a 2014 report, CIMA Cordillera Azul stated that other than the anticipated sale of 
carbon credits, there is no source of income for the restoration and deforestation 
offsetting activities planned under the carbon project (CIMA 2012, 2013; SCSGS 2013). 
However, while forestry carbon offset projects have the potential to sequester and 
store carbon, protect water resources and biodiversity, and offer economic opportunities, 
successfully designing programs that can do all three remains a challenge. Towards this 
end, this research uses a recently released high resolution carbon dataset (Asner et al. 
2014) alongside frameworks of deforestation probability and landscape connectivity to 
examine the potential for multi-objective landscape planning. The study employs a 
modification of least cost path to examine forest patch connectivity and uses this 
methodology to isolate the subsets of each forest patch corridor that represent the lowest 
1% in terms of cost. It also puts forth a new, spatially explicit model for deforestation in 
the area. Based on economic rent, the model prioritizes those areas that are cost effective 
                                                 
36 Paraphrased in English from the original text: “Para el ano 2028, el PNCAZ es un ANP que conserva 
integramente su diversidad biológica, es gestionado participativamente y como tal reconocido a nivel 
nacional e internacional; cuenta con sostenibilidad financiera y contribuye a la mejora de la calidad de vida 
de las poblaciones vecinas a través de las oportunidades que ofrece y su vex posibilita un desarrollo 
sostenible y planificado de su ZA” (page 24).  
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for conservation by identifying where there is both moderate deforestation risk and 
limited profitability. These conceptual models are then applied to a subregion of the 
Cordillera Azul buffer zone. There, they are intersected with the carbon dataset to 
determine how the three conservation priority schemes vary spatially, and if 
commonalities can be found between the distinct criteria.  
The deforestation model used in this study expands on previous baseline studies 
in the area by incorporating biophysical, social and economic variables. The result is a 
spatially explicit map of deforestation probabilities across the study zone that can be used 
for carbon offset projects in years to come. In addition, by incorporating the theoretical 
frameworks of economic rent and landscape ecology, this work presents new models for 
the study area and also provides new theoretical ground for the spatial analysis of multi-
criteria conservation planning schemes. Through its comparative analysis, the study finds 
that planners can design a configuration that prioritizes all three criteria.  
However, while the three criteria can be maximized simultaneously, this research 
also shows that in the case of Cordillera Azul the result may be just a small subset of the 
overall landscape. Considering this, a conservation scheme seeking to prioritize all three 
criteria would be wise to expand upon these results. CIMA Cordillera Azul (or similar 
conservation stakeholders) could extend their work to new communities in the buffer 
zone area. Additionally, areas that meet two of the three criteria could also be selected for 
secondary priority and targeted for increased efforts. Generating new levels of 
participation across the buffer zone communities and promoting connectivity-generating 
activities (e.g. agroforestry) outside the priority subset, would undoubtedly further such 
conservation efforts.  
In closing, despite all the caveats in the previous chapter, the methodology used 
by this work is useful for mid-scale landscape planning. As awareness of climate change 
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grows, carbon programs and similar mechanisms are likely to gain in popularity. In 2009, 
Lohmann estimated carbon market trade at over US$100 billion annually. He also 
estimated that these numbers would rival other major markets—such as that of financial 
derivatives—within a decade (Lohmann 2009).  
So far, Lohmann’s predictions seem to be holding true. In 2013 alone, eight new 
carbon markets opened their doors (World Bank 2014)37 and today carbon emissions 
remain the focus of both pollution reduction schemes and climate change mitigation 
strategies. While some of these take the form of regulations on fossil fuel industries, 
many more target deforestation and forest degradation—largely believed to be a less 
costly target (Naucler & Enkvist 2009, Antorini & Sathaye 2007, Stern 2006). Analyses 
such as the ones presented by this study will be useful as CIMA and other institutions 
work to improve offset initiatives and better target their efforts. If placed in the right 
hands, these models can then be improved upon through expert information, household 
data and survey work for improved accuracy and success.  
As pressures to mitigate climate change and protect forests cost effectively 
continue, policymakers and conservation practitioners will be faced with some difficult 
decisions. Tropical country interventions seeking to simultaneously reduce deforestation, 
protect biodiversity, and improve livelihoods entail complex socio-environmental trade-
offs (Andersen et al. 2014). Many ‘incentive schemes’ may overlook the inherent 
complexities of these systems (Pascual et al. 2014). By incorporating three unique 
frameworks for mid-scale planning, this research takes an essential step in determining if, 
and how, conservation may find peace among all three pillars.  
                                                 
37 The 8 new programs as of 2013 include California Cap-and-Trade Program, Québec Cap-and-Trade 
System, Kazakhstan Emissions Trading Scheme, and five Chinese pilot emissions trading schemes 




A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAN MARTIN 
Throughout the history of the Huallaga Valley, economic rent has played a 
fundamental role. After coca/cocaine was largely eradicated, large-scale agriculture—
particularly oil palm, rice, bananas and papaya—drove the demand for land in the 
region.38  While not the same as coca/cocaine profits, big agriculture still supplied 
smallholders with greater returns than traditional, localized farming methods. However, 
while coca/cocaine required a smaller harvest area to achieve a high profit, other forms of 
agriculture often required farmers to clear more land in order to achieve the same returns 
(Bradley and Millington 2008). In order to steer farmers into more sustainable farming 
without sending them into poverty, USAID and the Peruvian government had to offer 
equal—if not better—financial alternatives. These alternatives first took the form of 
coffee and cacao, followed shortly by the rapid expansion of forest carbon offset projects.  
1970-2002: Coca, Alternative Development and PNCAZ 
The region of San Martin lies in the heart of Peru. Nestled between the high peaks 
of the Andes and the jungle of the Amazon, it is renowned for its bountiful nature, 
beautiful people, and delicious food. It is the most productive department in Peru in terms 
of agriculture (Gomez et al. 2013), and often promotes itself as a globally recognized 
model for sustainable development (Cabieses 2010). 39 However, San Martin was not 
always this way. Beginning with the displacement of indigenous peoples when the area 
                                                 
38 It should be noted that while large scale agriculture may have certain factors that affect the price of land 
(such as access to roads and markets), these factors are often different for illicit crops, which farmers often 
attempt to hide from view (i.e. the same roads and market centers). 
39 Conservation International has a project page for the area, outlining sustainable development initiatives, 
as do many other similar institutions: http://www.conservation.org/projects/Pages/Developing-a-
Sustainable-Economy-in-San-Martin-Peru.aspx 
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was first colonized, the region has undergone numerous boom and bust cycles. Since the 
1970s, many of these have been tied to agriculture both legal and illicit, and have had a 
heavy influence on land use development in the area.  
Figure A1 shows some of the main agricultural, and later carbon and forestry-
related, events from the 1970s through present day. While San Martin experienced steady 
in-migration of peasant farmers during the 1950s, 60s, and 70s, it had a completely 
different draw ten years later. In 1970, Fernando Belaúnde Terry40 built the marginal 
regional highway, connecting Tarapoto to northern and coastal Peru. Migration levels 
exploded and soon after, the widespread production of native coca was introduced to the 
region as a cash crop for the production of cocaine. With the completion of the highway 
came improved transportation options for traffickers and increased accessibility to labor 
markets (UNODC 2013). 
                                                 
40 Fernando Belaúnde Terry was President of Peru for two consecutive terms, from 1963-1968 and again 
from 1980-1985. During his first term in office, Belaúnde pushed through many development policies. He 
also authored a book, La conquista del Perú por los Peruanos in 1959, which supported the conquering of 
Peru, and the jungle, by and for Spanish-descendant Peruvians.   
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Figure A1: An economic timeline of San Martin. 
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While drug trafficking undoubtedly affected the entire region, the Huallaga 
Valley was a main hub of this activity. By 1976, trafficking had arrived in San Martin 
through the village of Paraiso in Tocache (see Figure 1 for map) (UNODC 2013). 
Colombian drug cartels dominated this coca/cocaine41 trade, first through the Mendellin 
cartel and later through the Calli cartel. At the same time, the Revolutionary group, 
MRTA (“Movimiento Revoluncionario Tupac Amaru”) began to expand across the 
region. In the early 1980s, MRTA was largely displaced by members of Shining Path 
(“Sendero Luminoso”), a Peruvian revolutionary organization that employed guerilla 
tactics in support of Maoism.42  
Drug traffickers played off the insecurity left by MRTA and Shining Path. Soon 
San Martin was producing more coca than any other region of Peru—a country that was 
already considered the greatest producer of coca worldwide—by the early 1980s 
(UNODC 2013). A few short years later, 30,000 hectares of coca were in cultivation in 
San Martin. This was equal to over 290 sq. km (>115 sq. mi), and accounted for one-fifth 
of Peru’s total coca production (UNODC 2013). With each kilo of processed product 
fetching $2.50 USD, the booming coca/cocaine trade drew migrants from all over the 
country. Land conversion for coca/cocaine resulted in massive amounts43 of deforestation 
and largely endangered many of the Huallaga Valley’s native species (Young 1994, 1996, 
Dourojeanni 1992). Despite some alleged crackdowns on coca/cocaine during these 
years, politicians and institutional decisions also further enabled the drug trade, though 
many of these did not come to light until later.44  
                                                 
41 The term coca/cocaine is used here to differentiate between the illicit coca trade for the production of 
cocaine, and the legal production of coca for traditional use.  
42 Shining Path is known for their acts of terrorism, brutality, and violence against numerous citizens.   
43 Young (1996) estimated that most of the 223,200 hectares of hill agriculture present in the Huallaga 
Valley were deforested after 1975 as coca production spread through the region.   
44 Example: In 2001, scandal erupted when evidence was released indicating that both Nicolas Hermoza, 
commander of Peru’s army from 1992 to 1998, and Vladimiro Montesinos, the ex-head of Peru’s 
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The 1990s saw increased efforts to control the coca/cocaine industry. In an effort 
to control the insurgency and guerilla activity taking place, the Peruvian government 
moved to decriminalize coca/cocaine farmers between 1991 and 1994 (UNODC 2013). 
However, as the Colombian cartels were forced out, Mexican cartels moved in (UNODC 
2013). To combat this new threat, Peru made large national efforts and collaborated with 
the U.S. government.45 Much of San Martin’s coca plantings were manually cut down. 
Others were sprayed with herbicides. As more and more lands fell infertile, the 
coca/cocaine trade crashed. By 1996, less than half (46%) of San Martin’s economic 
production was due to coca/cocaine. The price per kilo had fallen from its high of $2.50 
in the 1980s to just 0.04 cents per dollar. Eventually even other businesses—such as the 
discotecas, hotels, and restaurants that had sprouted up in response to the economic 
boom—were extinguished (Cabieses 2010). Populations dwindled. Between 1996 and 
2000, 3,700 hectares of coca bush were eradicated annually on average. By 2001, 70% of 
San Martin lived below the poverty line due to the direct and indirect consequences of the 
anti-drug campaign (UNODC 2013) (Figure A1). 
As more and more countries began to battle drug trafficking, international 
counteractions amped up. In 1998, the United Nations accepted “alternative 
development” as part of their global strategy for drug control. In coordination, the United 
States government began providing incentives for alternative development programs in 
the region (SCSGS 2013, Cabieses 2010, UNODC 2013). USAID initiatives aimed at 
helping farmers access credit to expand and support conventional crops as alternatives to 
coca and increase the productivity of existing farms (USAID 2012, USAID 2009). Over 
                                                                                                                                                 
intelligence service, had been receiving $50,000 for every drug-laden plane allowed to leave the Huallaga 
during these coca-centric years (BBC 2001). 
45 In 1998, Congress passed the Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act, which authorized the spending 
of $2.3 billion for international counternarcotic operations (H.R.  1998). Peru was one of the main country 
targets of the enacted bill. 
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the next several years, over $100 million USD were invested in Peru in the form of 
international cooperation, specifically for the establishment of such projects (UNODC 
2013). Many believe that these alternative development initiatives in San Martin were a 
main driving force behind land use change in the region, and also supported San Martin’s 
lack of involvement in Peru’s second coca boom in the 2000s.46   
As the financial gap left by coca/cocaine eventually began to be replaced by 
alternative development programs, San Martin began to recover economically. Farmers 
returned to the region. By the mid-2000s, over 235,000 hectares of land were in use for 
legal crops, primarily for the production of rice, palm oil, and maize (Cabieses 2010, 
UNODC 2013, see Figure A1). 
However, incentives by the U.S. government may have had additional effects 
beyond coca/cocaine eradication and the establishment of alternative economic pathways 
(UNODC 2013). Specifically, they may have supported environmental degradation by 
improving market access and infrastructure—key necessities for the success of big 
agriculture, and also main drivers for deforestation (Barber 2014, Andersen et al. 2012, 
Kirby & Potvin 2007, Nelson & Hellerstein 1997). Whereas traditional farming in the 
area had mostly taken the form of subsistence agriculture with minimal technology and 
only occasional slash and burn techniques, following the coca/cocaine trade people 
strived for higher yields and profit (SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012). Newly arrived farmers—
often from the Andes or coast of Peru—expressed a fondness for large-scale, single-crop 
production (IGES 2014, SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012, 2013). In contrast to migrants from 
within the region, who tend to be familiar with the ecosystem and report appreciating the 
                                                 
46 This boom was headed by the Mexican drug cartels and resulted in coca increasing in the neighboring 
department of Huánuco from 9,000 hectares in 2000 to 18,000 hectares in 2009 (UNODC 2013). 
Nationally, effects were similar. In Peru as a whole, coca bush cultivation grew from 38,700 hectares in 
1999 to 61,200 hectares by 2010. However, in contrast to the 1980s, much of this expansion now focused 
on the southern end of the country (UNODC 2013). 
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forest for its cultural value, most of the outside migrants reported feeling uncomfortable 
with the dense trees of the cloud forest (CIMA 2013). In reaction, these new arrivals 
often cut and burned the trees, claiming land tenure through deforestation. They then 
planted maize, rice, plantains or other monocultures with low startup costs and 
reasonably high yields, and farmed the area until the land eroded or became unfertile. 
Once the yields dropped low enough, they moved on to a new parcel of land and repeated 
the cycle (CIMA 2012, 2013, Bernardi 2005). As populations continued to swell, this 
pressure eventually resulted in more deforestation, land degradation and the deterioration 
of local water quality (SCSGS 2013, CIMA 2012). 
In response to the mounting environmental pressures in San Martin, the Peruvian 
government began implementing zoning and protection strategies over the northern 
Cordillera Azul mountain range, an area stretching 2.5 million hectares between the 
Huallaga and Ucayali rivers (see Figure 1, Chapter 2). The area was considered the “last 
large, intact expanse of lower-montane forest remaining in Peru” (Alverson et al. 2001). 
On September 7th, 2000, nearly 1.14 million hectares were declared a “reserved zone” 
(Zona Reservada Biabo Cordillera Azul) to protect the area from agricultural expansion 
and timber harvesting. In addition, the 984,000 hectares of lowland forest adjacent to the 
zone, in the east, were simultaneously designated as permanent production forests 
(Bosque de Produccion de la Zona Forestal Permanente).47  
While these designations offered some protection, Peruvian researchers and 
conservationists began to worry that the concession would attract new roads and 
colonization. In an effort to counteract these pressures, a three-week Rapid Biological 
Inventory (RBI) was carried out in 2002 by research scientists in coordination with the 
Field Museum of Chicago (Alverson et al. 2001). The RBI noted in detail the high 
                                                 
47 Of these 984,000 hectares, 64,700 hectares belonged to indigenous communities, were designated for 
colonists, or were in litigation as of 2000 (Alverson et al. 2001). 
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diversity of both species and habitats within the park, as well as a couple dozen species 
that were new to science.48 It also noted imminent threats included logging, new roads, 
colonization and timber removal (Alverson et al. 2001). In particular, the RBI report 
noted that the “disorganized expansion of small-scale agriculture” remained a prominent 
threat, especially from the north, and that “immediate threat” was present from the 
logging concessions to the east.49  
Following this inventory and report, Cordillera Azul National Park was 
established at the edge of the Huallaga Valley in 2002 (CIMA 2012, see Figure A1). 
Today, it is Peru’s third largest national park, protecting over 1.3 million hectares of 
forest and an additional 2.5 million hectares of buffer zone (Althelia 2015, CIMA 2012, 
2013). It is home to an estimated 6,000 species of plants, 600 species of birds, 180 
species of fishes, and over 80 species of large and medium sized mammal, and is often 
touted as a model for innovative community-park partnerships (Althelia 2015, IGES 
2014). 
2002-Present: The Rise of Coffee, Cacao, and Carbon 
Though the establishment of Cordillera Azul National Park was a strong move for 
conservation, some viewed the park’s creation as a barrier to economic activities. 
Communities in the buffer zone suffered from poverty and many blamed the park and the 
increased regulations over buffer zone activities. In an effort to avoid further detrimental 
land use, USAID and other development organizations began to re-promote traditional 
methods of agroforestry (USAID 2012, USAID 2009). Specifically, USAID promoted 
                                                 
48 The RBI identified 71 species of mammals, 500 species of birds, 82 species of amphibians and reptiles, 
and 93 species of fish within the park. Twenty-eight of these were believed to be new to science. Given the 
rapid nature of the inventory, many more species were thought to be in existence and as of yet unobserved.  
49 While the report also stated that coca/cocaine plantations had destroyed large portions of the western 
mountains, it specifies that many of the fields around the Santa Lucía police base were abandoned and 
appeared to be reverting to forest. 
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coffee and cacao, two products previously considered smallholder crops. Coffee and 
cacao could be grown beside cassavas and other household consumption goods for sale to 
larger market (UNODC 2013, Cabieses 2010).  
By selecting coffee and cacao as main focal crops, USAID, the Peruvian 
Government, and other institutions state that they aimed to promote environmental 
sustainability, entrepreneurship, and economic stability. Farmer cooperatives allowed 
small farmers to band together for larger profits, leveraging economies of scale (UNODC 
2013). By 2008 the poverty rate in San Martin had decreased by more than half since 
2001 with coca/cocaine production at just 0.5% of San Martin’s economic products 
(UNODC 2013, Cabieses 2010). By 2011, revenues from Peruvian cacao farmers had 
grown by more than ten times—from a national total of $3 million USD in 2004 to over 
$35 million USD by 2011 (UNODC 2013, Cabieses 2010). The following year, San 
Martin was named the most productive Peruvian region by volume for cacao (Gomez et 
al. 2013). By 2013 San Martin remained the largest producer, and was responsible for 
33% of national production (see Figure A1).50    
Today, at least twenty-six different producers’ cooperatives and community 
groups are actively working with coffee and cacao in Peru. Five of these operate directly 
in the Cordillera Azul buffer zone, and one—the Acopagro Cooperative—even targets 
the central Huallaga Valley (UNODC 2013). According to their website, Acopagro is “an 
organization of small cacao producers who produce high quality product.”51  In 2013, 
their work included 2,000 members and occupied a cultivated area of 6,000 hectares 
(UNODC 2013).  
                                                 
50 San Martin was also named the first producer of oil palm (79%) and rice (19%), the second producer of 
bananas and papaya (approx. 19% each), and the third producer of coffee (19%) (UNODC 2013), however 
much of this production occurred in areas outside of the area of interest for this study.  
51 According to ACOPAGRO’s website. See http://acopagro.com.pe/quienes-somos/ for more. 
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These cooperatives have been highly influential in defining recent land use 
change in the central Huallaga Valley. Prior to their introduction to the area (in 2003) 
none of the communities operating in the central valley portion of the PNCAZ buffer 
zone were growing cacao and only five communities were growing some amount of 
coffee (CIMA MUF 2003 and field data from CIMA 2015). As of early 2015, this has all 
changed. Figure A2, below, shows the distribution of cacao-producing communities in 
the central Huallaga Valley as of July 2015. Of the 23 communities for which data is 
available, 15 are now producing cacao as a main market product.  
 
 
Figure A2: Coffee and cacao-producing communities, July 2015.52  
                                                 
52 Note that given how dynamic community establishment, mobility, and titling is in the area, community 
names may have changed.   
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In addition to coffee and cacao, a third “C”—carbon—has also come to dominate 
the buffer zone of Cordillera Azul. As international markets for carbon offsetting grew, 
Peru’s forests took on a new value. In 2004, the country initiated 18 carbon projects 
designed to pay forest managers, governments, and institutions for their efforts in 
avoiding deforestation or reestablishing forest ecosystems (FONAM 2012). By 2012, this 
number had soared to over 200 (FONAM 2012, see Figure A1). CIMA Cordillera Azul’s 
recent award of over Euro €8 million carbon bonds (at COP20 in Lima, source: MINAM 
2014) suggests that carbon is now a key component of the conservation frontier; one that 
will need to be balanced with the other social and ecological protections in place.  
In the case of the central Huallaga Valley the balance among economic 
incentives, social order, and biological preservation is a delicate one. In addition to 
understanding the complex history of this area, there are also key theoretical and 
analytical dimensions to how conservation priority gets assigned. The chapter that 
follows will explore these through a brief overview of carbon markets, landscape 
ecology, and the social and economic forces at play within the study site.   
THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF ECONOMIC RENT (AND BID-RENT) 
The principle of economic rent is critical to understanding the transformation of 
tropical forests. Simply, economic rent can be defined as any income above and beyond 
normal profits that is due to scarcity of a factor of production.53 Historically this concept 
has taken two main pathways. The first, proposed by David Ricardo (1891)54, suggests 
that rent varies due to land quality (e.g. the scarcity of high quality soil, water resources, 
                                                 
53 Ricardian rent should not be confused with contract rent, which is the "actual payments tenants make for 
use of the properties of others" (Barlow 1986). Instead, the Law of Rent refers to the economic return that 
lands accrue for their use in production. Unlike profit, economic rent does not necessarily involve 
productive human action. It can also not be eliminated by competition, as all natural resources and 
locations inherently yield economic rent.  
54 Ricardo is thought to have formulated the concept in 1809, later publishing on it in his magnum opus, 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.  
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etc.).55 The second, modified by J.H. von Thünen,56 states that location is also a factor of 
production, and thus transport costs also affect rent (von Thünen 1966). This is due to the 
fact that agricultural prices are often given at the market center, but farmgate prices (i.e. 
the price the producer receives) are the result of this agricultural market price minus 
transportation costs from the farm to market. While von Thünen’s model is sometimes 
criticized for focusing on the “isolated state” (e.g. overlooking differential transportation 
costs, variations in topography, site differences and chances in commodity prices), the 
framework of the theory is still largely considered to be relevant. For instance, distance 
to/from markets, distance to roads, and the type of roads nearby still largely impact the 
value of the land and the probability that it will be purchased and/or deforested (Barber 
2014, Andersen et al. 2012, Kirby & Potvin 2007, Angelsen 1999, Omamo 1998, Nelson 
& Hellerstein 1997, Zeller et al. 1997).  
The deforestation model presented by this study accounts for the Ricardian 
definition of rent through the vector of biophysical controls (i.e. soil type, precipitation, 
slope and elevation). It accounts for the von Thünen model57 of land-rent through the 
independent variables of cost distance and Euclidean distance, respectively, based on 
freight cost.  
Taking these two variations on rent into account, rent can be stated as: 
(1)  
Where is the price of output for use k at land plot i, is a vector of price 
inputs (i.e. average costs) to k at plot i, and  is the potential output quantity (modified 
                                                 
55 Ricardo defined rent as equal to the economic advantage obtained by using a site (plot of land, etc.) in its 
most productive use, as compared to the advantage obtained when using a marginal site for the same 
purpose with the same inputs of capital and labor. 
56 Johann Heinrich von Thünen is renowned for his great influence in developing the spatial analysis of 





from Chomitz and Gray 1996).  In this equation, P and C are both functions of 
transportation cost; varying with the accessibility and location of land plot i and 
connecting rent to a spatial economy.  
In addition to the concept of rent, the theory of bid-rent can also be used to 
understand land use decisions within the study area. If all farmers are rational, profit and 
utility maximizers, acting with perfect information, the theory of bid-rent assures that 
land is allocated efficiently, i.e. to its highest profitable use. This signifies that land use 
observed within the study area is, in theory, the option that results in the highest rent. If 
for some reason the farmer is not utilizing their land to the highest profit, they experience 
opportunity costs, or forgone profits due to a less efficient land use.  
Assuming that all land owners are rational, profit and utility maximizers, then the 
theory of bid-rent states that land will naturally become allocated to its highest profitable 
use. For instance, if a farmer is growing corn but knows that soybeans are more 
profitable, the farmer will elect to change crops to increase their profit. If a farmer is 
growing corn, but is unaware that soybeans are more profitable, another farmer will offer 
to buy them out for slightly more than their current corn profits. This will continue with 
the farmer either choosing to change production or another party purchasing the rights to 
do so, until the land reaches its highest profitable use.  
In the real world, economic rent and bid-rent often interact with one another. 
They both deal with scarcity, either of a natural resource, a quality for production, or 
access to markets, and they both contribute to the land’s perceived value. They also tend 
to be correlated positively with deforestation (See Figure 2, Chapter 3).  
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ILLICIT FORCES IN THE CORDILLERA AZUL BUFFER ZONE 
In a recent study still under review, NGO staff and government officials in San 
Martin report that land trafficking is common to the department, and field work for this 
thesis confirms this (Holland & Coomes in review, field work 2015). Defined as “a 
particularly aggressive form of land speculation whereby well-connected individuals and 
groups claim large tracts of land that are generally beyond the administrative reach of 
regional and local government” (Conservation International 2011 and ProCeja 2011, as 
cited in Holland and Coomes in review), land trafficking in the study area often involves 
the piecemeal selling of land (regardless of tenure) to new migrants, often from distant 
districts in the Sierra where people are unfamiliar with San Martin or the land being sold.  
In addition to land trafficking, coca/cocaine production, illegal harvest of timber, 
and other illicit activities are thought to still occur in the area. While these products may 
be cultivated in smaller patches (see Bradley and Millington 2008 for more), their 
negative impact on forest health and continuity is undoubted (Young 1996). Largely 
untracked due to their illicit nature, the deforestation, forest degradation, and 
contamination that occur as a process of these activities cause undoubted harm to nearby 







It should be noted that questions were written and conducted in Spanish, and were 
accompanied by drawings and visual aids produced by Kaitlin Tasker in coordination 
with CIMA Cordillera Azul.  
1. ¿En qué comunidad vive? 
2.  ¿Desde cuándo vive acá? 
3. ¿Qué cultivos tiene en su chacra? 
4. ¿Cuánto terreno tiene? (Ambas áreas cultivadas y no cultivadas) 
5. ¿Cuánto terreno cultivado tiene? 
6. ¿Cuantas hectáreas de cacao o café tiene?  
7. ¿Qué variedades de cacao o café tiene? 
a. Cacao: 
b. Café: 
8. ¿Qué sistema de cultivo usa? (Cultiva asociado a árboles, cultiva en 
limpio, etc.) 
9. ¿Cuánto pagarías por…. 
a. …Una hectárea de terreno sin ningún cultivo?  
b. …Una hectárea con cultivos iniciales?  
c. …Con cultivos en producción? 
10. ¿De qué depende el costo del terreno?  
11. ¿Consume lo que produce en su terreno?              
12. ¿Cuánto de lo que produce, vende?  
13. ¿Dónde lo vende? ¿A quién lo vende? (En la misma chacra, a una persona 
intermediaria, a personas en la comunidad, en un centro (seco, en baba…) 
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14. ¿Cuánto le pagan por sus productos?  
a. En las meses de lluvia:  
b. En las meses sin lluvia: 
15. ¿De qué depende el precio de sus productos? (La calidad, tiempo/clima, 
acceso al mercado, flete, donde fue cultivado, cantidad, etc.) 
16. ¿Cuánto está produciendo ahora por su campaña?  
a. Cacao: _________________ kg/ha 
b. Café: ___________________ quintales/ha 
c. Otro producto: _______________ 
17. ¿Cuánto espera producir en el futuro? 
a. Cacao: _________________ kg/ha 
b. Café: ___________________ quintales/ha 
18. ¿Por qué media transporta sus productos a los lugares donde los vende? 
(Por caballo, en camioneta por carretera…) 
19. ¿En qué meses es más difícil transportar sus productos?  
20. ¿Cuánto más paga por transportar sus productos en estos meses difíciles? 
21. ¿Trabaja con intermediarios para la comercialización de sus productos?        
22. ¿Cuánto tiempo demora para que sus productos lleguen al destino final 
cuando la vía de acceso está buena? ¿Y cuándo esta mala?             
a. Si se sabe el nombre de la carretera, o por donde pasa, esa 
información nos ayudaría bastante: 
23. ¿Qué productos compra para su familia, para la alimentación diaria o 
herramientas de chacra? ¿Dónde los compra? ¿Y cuánto paga?  
24. ¿Existen programas, proyectos, organizaciones, etc. en el área que les dan 
beneficios por conservar los bosques? 
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25. ¿Qué beneficios son? (Pagan, dan apoyo técnico, en infraestructura, etc.) 
26. ¿Qué beneficios nuevos esperaría de esos programas? (insumos, asistencia 
técnica, que paguen, etc.) 
 86 
 
Glossary of Acronyms 
 
ACD   Aboveground carbon density 
AOI   Area of Interest 
CAO   Carnegie Airborne Observatory 
CCBS    Climate, Community and Biodiversity Standards 
CIMA   Centro de Conservación, Investigación, y Manejo de Áreas 
Naturales (Center for Conservation, Research, and Management of 
Natural Areas) 
CO2   Carbon Dioxide 
ED   Euclidean distance 
EDroads  Euclidean distance to roads 
EDwater  Euclidean distance to waterways 
FONAM Fondo Nacional del Ambiente (National Environmental Fund - 
Peru) 
GIS   Geographic Information System 
LiDAR  Light Detection And Ranging (or: Light, Imaging, Detection, And 
Ranging) 
MINAM  Ministerio del Ambiente (Ministry of the Environment – Peru) 
m.s.l.   Meters above sea level 
MRTA   Movimiento Revolucionario Tupac Amaru 
PNCAZ  el Parque Nacional Cordillera Azul (Cordillera Azul National 
Park) 
RBI   Rapid Biological Inventory 
REDD/REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation  
REP   Relative Effect of Population 
SERNANP El Servicio Nacional de Áreas Naturales Protegidas por el Estado 
(National Service of Protected Areas - Peru) 
UNODC  United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime 
USAID  United States Agency for International Development 
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